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It is no secret that the Supreme Court has become a deeply divided
institution. Its divisions are reflected, for example, in sharp disagree-
ments over such issues as the constitutionality of the death penalty, the
contours of the right to an abortion, and the scope of states' immunity
from suit under the eleventh amendment. They are reflected in the
growing polarization of the Court's voting lineups. And they are fur-
ther reflected in the rising numbers of separate writings, as Justices
choose to express their individual views at the expense of uniting be-
hind a single opinion.
Less widely observed, but no less prevalent, are heated disagree-
ments over the Court's internal operating rules-the rules the Court
uses in deciding whether, and how, to decide particular cases. The
Court traditionally has been reluctant to make public its inner work-
ings. But the last few Terms have yielded a surprising number of opin-
ions concerning these internal operating rules. The Justices' positions
on these rules often are as bitterly divided as their positions on various
substantive issues.
In part, of course, these disagreements can be the result of sub-
stantive conflicts. Indeed, a Justice might adopt a position on an oper-
ating rule because of its potential effect on the outcome of a particular
case. But conflicts over internal operating rules can also reflect a
broader struggle over the nature of the Court as an institution and over
its responsibilities to the litigants before it and to the legal system as a
whole.
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This Article examines disputes over two important internal proce-
dures: the "Rule of Four," which governs the Court's selection for ple-
nary review of cases on its discretionary docket; and the "hold" rule, or
"Rule of Three," which postpones decisions on petitions for certiorari
or jurisdictional statements pending disposition of a case already given
plenary review. While the existence of the Rule of Four has been
known publicly at least since 1925 and the Justices have frequently
debated its scope, the hold rule was not explicitly discussed by the
Court until the 1985 Term, and it was not until the 1986 Term that
the Court indicated that that rule was in fact a Rule of Three.
Both the Rule of Four and the hold rule are nonmajority rules:
they can be invoked by fewer than half the Justices. At the same time,
however, they set in motion a process whose outcome-a decision on
the merits-is ultimately decided by majority vote. This Article looks at
what happens when a minority's invocation of these rules conflicts with
the contrary desire of a majority of the Court. The reasons for examin-
ing these conflicts are, first, to see whether a coherent view of the rules'
boundaries emerges and, second, to determine the purpose, if any, of
their nonmajority nature. This Article suggests how different visions of
the role of the Court lead to different resolutions of the conflicts be-
tween the majority and a minority, and to different explanations as to
why a majority vote is not required.
Two important conclusions emerge from this inquiry. First, the
Court's operating rules have a significant impact on the Court's sub-
stantive decisions and on the behavior of various actors in our legal
system. They affect, for example, the stability of precedent, the scope of
retroactivity of substantive decisions, and the incentives faced by liti-
gants. Second, the Justices' views on the scope of these rules exhibit a
remarkable degree of inconsistency and incoherence. Their disregard
for these essential attributes of adjudication, albeit in a procedural con-
text, raises serious questions about their respect for substantive legal
doctrines.
I. THE RULE OF FOUR
The Rule of Four is the mechanism that the Supreme Court uses
to determine to which of the approximately four thousand cases on its
discretionary docket it will give full consideration on the merits.1
1 It is surprising, particularly given the overwhelming support by the Justices for
the abolition of the Court's mandatory jurisdiction, see S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON,
REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT'S ROLE 117 (1986), that the Court's official statis-
tical sheet does not indicate how many cases invoke its discretionary jurisdiction and
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Broadly speaking, the Court will schedule full briefing and oral argu-
ment whenever four Justices agree that a case deserves plenary
consideration.2
Part I first discusses the genesis of the Rule of Four, the incom-
pleteness with which it is specified, and the lack of exclusive criteria to
govern the Court's exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction. Next, it identi-
fies three areas in which the Rule potentially collides with majority
rules governing other aspects of the Court's business and shows the
deep divisions that have emerged as the Court has attempted to deal
with these conflicts. Finally, it examines the shortcomings of the tradi-
tional view of why grants of certiorari are governed by a nonmajority
rule, puts forth alternative views that have more explanatory power,
and shows how different resolutions of the conflicts between the Rule of
Four and the Court's majority rules can undermine the goals served by
the nonmajority character of the Rule of Four.
A. Genesis of the Rule
The Rule of Four first received public attention during the con-
gressional hearings that preceded the passage of the Judiciary Act of
1925,' which converted a large part of the Court's mandatory jurisdic-
how many invoke its mandatory jurisdiction. That sheet indicates, however, that the
total number of filings in the 1986, 1985, and 1984 Terms was 5123, 5158, and 5006,
respectively. Statistical Recap of Supreme Court's Workload During Last Three
Terms, 56 U.S.L.W. 3102 (1987). It has been estimated that approximately twenty-five
percent of these cases are mandatory appeals. See Coleman, The Supreme Court of the
United States: Managing Its Caseload to Achieve Its Constitutional Purposes, 52
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 17 (1983).
2 Under its discretionary jurisdiction, the Court reviews, primarily, "[c]ases in the
courts of appeals . . . [either] before or after rendition of judgment or decree," 28
U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1982), and "[flinal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest
court of a State in which a decision could be had" that are challenged on federal
grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1982). See also 28 U.S.C § 1258(3) (1982) (Supreme
Court of Puerto Rico); 28 U.S.C. § 1259 (Supp. III 1985) (Court of Military
Appeals).
In addition, the Court has mandatory appellate jurisdiction, principally over cases
in which the courts of appeals strike down a state statute on federal grounds, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254(2) (1982), and over final judgments or decrees of state courts that strike down a
federal statute or treaty or that reject a federal constitutional challenge to a state stat-
ute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1257(1)-(2) (1982). See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1258(1)-(2) (1982) (Su-
preme Court of Puerto Rico).
This Article focuses primarily on the Court's discretionary jurisdiction. But some
of its conclusions are also relevant to the Court's mandatory jurisdiction. See infra note
173.
' Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936 (current version codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1294 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). The Act is known as the Judges' Bill because
it was drafted by a committee of Supreme Court Justices. Justice Van Devanter played
the central role in this endeavor. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS
OF THE SUPREME COURT 259-60 (1928).
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tion into discretionary jurisdiction.' Even before 1925, the Court had
enjoyed some discretionary jurisdiction, and the manner in which it had
made decisions on which cases to review became a focus of the hear-
ings.5 In seeking to' reassure Congress that giving the Court greater
control over its docket would not result in the arbitrary denial of re-
view, Justice Van Devanter recounted during the hearings the Court's
then-existing practice with respect to its more limited discretionary
docket: "We always grant the petition when as many as four think that
it should be granted, and sometimes when as many as three think that
way."' Justice Van Devanter further explained that
if there were five votes against granting the petition and four
in favor of granting it, it would be granted, because we pro-
ceed upon the theory that when as many as four members of
the court, and even three in some instances, are impressed
with the propriety of our taking the case the petiton [sic]
should be granted.
7
Similarly, in 1937, during the controversy over President
Roosevelt's proposal to pack the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Hughes
stated: "A vote by a majority [to grant certiorari] is not required ....
[E]ven if two or three of the Justices are strongly of the opinion that
certiorari should be allowed, frequently the other Justices will acqui-
esce in their view, but the petition is always granted if four so vote.""
" Procedure in Federal Courts: Hearings on S. 2060 and S. 2061 Before a
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 26-27 (1924)
(statement of Justice Van Devanter) (detailing the effects of the bill) [hereinafter Sen-
ate Hearings]; see, e.g., F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 3, at 260-73 (main
purpose of the Act was to reduce litigation before the Supreme Court); Frankfurter &
Landis, The Supreme Court Under the Judiciary Act of 1925, 42 HARV. L. REv. 1,
10-11 (1928) (empirical data showing the large percentage increase in discretionary
jurisdiction relative to mandatory appeals following the passage of the Act); Hellman,
The Business of the Supreme Court Under the Judiciary Act of 1925: The Plenary
Docket in the 1970's, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1711, 1726-27 (1978) (data showing that the
great percentage of all cases on the Court's docket are based on certiorari); Stevens, The
Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 10 (1983) (asserting that the
Act copes with the "'utterly impossible' task" of deciding every case before the Court
on the merits).
5 Leiman, The Rule of Four, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 976 (1957) (discussing
what "Congress thought to be the practice of the Court" with respect to its discretion-
ary jurisdiction prior to 1925).
1 Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of Appeals and of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings on H.R. 8206 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
68th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1924) [hereinafter 1924 House Hearings].
7 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 29.
8 Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary: Hearings on S. 1392 Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, 490 (1937) (letter of Chief
Justice Hughes read by Senator Wheeler); see Leiman, supra note 5, at 981-82.
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Since 1937, it has become fairly clear that the rule is in fact a Rule of
Four.9 The fact that three Justices often dissent publicly from denials
of certiorari shows that the strong opinions of a small minority now are
insufficient to trigger plenary consideration.10
While there is no doubt that, under the Rule of Four, four Jus-
tices have the power to commit the Court to do something, the Judici-
ary Act and its legislative history do not specify what this something
9 It may be, however, that in certain cases a Justice who was originally inclined to
deny will vote to grant as a result of the strong views of three of his colleagues. See S.
ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 1, at 107 (discussing vote to 'join three"). But it
is clear that in many cases the strong views of three Justices are not enough. See infra
note 10.
Justice Douglas's papers reveal that in 1969, when the Court was operating with
only eight Justices as a result of the resignation of Justice Abe Fortas, it held cases in
which three Justices had voted to grant certiorari pending a possible fourth vote by
Justice Fortas's replacement. But it did not grant certiorari based only on three votes.
See THE DOUGLAS LETTERS: SELECTIONS FROM THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF JUSTICE
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 139 & n.1 (M. Urofsky ed. 1987). It is not clear whether three
out of seven votes are sufficient to grant certiorari. See C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E.
COOPER & E. GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4004, at 516 &
n.37 (1977).
10 This phenomenon has been relatively frequent in recent years. See, e.g., Mitch-
ell v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 3249 (1987); Norvell v. Miller, 106 S. Ct. 1995 (1986); Michi-
gan v. Little, 474 U.S. 1024 (1985); Busby v. Louisiana, 474 U.S. 873 (1985); Young
v. Lehman, 471 U.S. 1061 (1985); Gould v. Adams, 469 U.S. 1122 (1985); Bushey v.
New York State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 469 U.S. 1117 (1985). But it is by no means
purely a recent phenomenon. See, e.g., Howard v. Texas, 386 U.S. 928 (1967);
Bertman v. J.A. Kirsch Co., 377 U.S. 995 (1964).
Moreover, not every Justice who votes in conference to grant certiorari dissents on
the public record in every case in which certiorari is denied. See R. STERN, E. GRESS-
MAN & S. SHAPIRO, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 5.6, at 267 (6th ed. 1986). Even
fewer do more than summarily note their vote. Writing a dissent from denial of certio-
rari can be time consuming. Thus, one is likely to see written dissents from denial in
only three kinds of cases: 1) cases in which the minority seeks to focus attention on the
outrageousness of the majority's denial of certiorari, see, e.g., Busby, 474 U.S. at 873
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Once again this Court has declined to correct an error of
constitutional magnitude with a defendant's life in the balance."); 2) cases in which the
minority hopes to encourage future litigants to continue pressing the issue upon the
Court, see, e.g., McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 970 (1983) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) ("[I]t is time to reexamine whether the rule announced in [Swain v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 202 (1965)] can be reconciled with the Sixth Amendment right of every de-
fendant."); or 3) cases in which, at the time the dissent was drafted and circulated, the
minority hoped to pick up a fourth vote for certiorari.
Conversely, it is possible that four Justices will dissent from the denial of certio-
rari. In a series of obscenity cases in 1974 and 1975, "four Justices who believe[d]
certiorari should issue. . . waive[d] the right to insist on decision, in recognition of the
Court's clear five to four division on the merits." C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER
& E. GRESSMAN, supra note 9, § 4004, at 513 n.28 (collecting cases).
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actually is.11 Thus, it is not surprising that the Court has found it diffi-
cult to define the Rule's scope.12
Moreover, the criteria that the Court is expected to apply in decid-
ing whether to grant certiorari are similarly opaque. Neither the Judi-
ciary Act of 1925 nor any other statutory enactment define such crite-
ria. The fullest explanation in the legislative history is contained in
testimony by Chief Justice Taft on behalf of a predecessor bill:
The question is whether the questions as presented are suffi-
ciently important, considering the function that the Supreme
Court has to play-to justify and require the court to let the
case into the court for a full hearing on the merits ...
. . . No litigant is entitled to more than two chances,
namely, to the original trial and to a review, and the inter-
mediate courts of review are provided for that purpose.
When a case goes beyond that, it is not primarily to preserve
the rights of the litigants. The Supreme Court's function is
for the purpose of expounding and stabilizing principles of
law for the benefit of the people of the country, passing upon
constitutional questions and other important questions of law
for the public benefit. It is to preserve uniformity of decision
among the intermediate courts of appeals. 3
This explanation does little more than establish that it is the inter-
est of the Court, rather than the interest of the litigants, that should
govern the decision whether to grant certiorari. It does not purport to
set forth specific, exclusive criteria to guide that decision.
Such criteria are also lacking in Supreme Court Rule 17, the "of-
ficial" statement of the reasons for a grant, which provides:
A review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right,
but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only where
there are special and important reasons therefor. The follow-
ing, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the
" The relevant statutes prescribe only the jurisdictional prerequisites to certiorari.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257-1259 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The hearings on the
Judiciary Act do not explain what should happen following the grant of certiorari. See
Senate Hearings, supra note 4.
12 See infra notes 16-132 and accompanying text.
13 Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of Appeals and United States Supreme Court:
Hearings on H.R. 10479 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1922) (testimony of Chief Justice Taft) [hereinafter 1922 House Hearings].
Justice Van Devanter stated even more cryptically in 1924 that "the Supreme
Court should not be required to review the case unless there be in it come [sic] question
or matter of such importance as would cause that court in the exercise of a sound
discretion to take the case." Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 28.
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Court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will
be considered.
(a) When a federal court of appeals has rendered a de-
cision in conflict with the decision of another federal court of
appeals on the same matter; or has decided a federal ques-
tion in a way in conflict with a state court of last resort; or
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure by
a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this Court's power
of supervision.
(b) When a state court of last resort has decided a fed-
eral question in a way in conflict with the decision of an-
other state court of last resort or of a federal court of
appeals.
(c) When a state court or federal court of appeals has
decided an important question of federal law which has not
been, but should be, settled by this Court, or has decided a
federal question in a way in conflict with applicable deci-
sions of this Court.
14
In light of the fact that Rule 17, by its own terms, is not "controlling"
or a "ful(l1] measur[e]" of the Court's discretion, and of the inevitable
slipperiness of such concepts as "conflict" among the circuits and "im-
portant" questions of law, Rule 17 provides only the most general
guidance to the Court. 5
B. Limits of the Rule
As discussed above, while' the Rule of Four means that the Court
will grant certiorari whenever four Justices vote to do so, the governing
statute, its legislative history, and the Court's own rules and practices
all fail to define what obligations the grant of certiorari imposes on the
Court as a whole and on the various Justices.' The Court's published
opinions reveal three important cleavages on these issues. First, does
the grant of certiorari place on the five Justices who voted to deny cer-
tiorari an affirmative duty to preserve the Court's jurisdiction?1 7 Sec-
14 SUP. CT. R. 17.
15 See S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 1, at 42-43, 106-09; D.
PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 3 (1980) (char-
acterizing as "obscure" the standards that the Court applies in deciding whether to take
a case on the merits).
16 See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1625 (2d ed. 1973).
17 For example, if four Justices vote to grant certiorari in order to decide whether
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ond, are there circumstances in which the five Justices who voted to
deny certiorari can take affirmative steps to prevent the Court from
deciding a case on the merits?18 Finally, does the grant of certiorari in
a case impose on individual Justices a duty to decide that case?
The first two questions focus on what actions the Court will take
in the face of a grant of certiorari. They arise only when certiorari has
been granted despite the fact that a majority of the Justices voted to
deny. If, instead, it is a majority of the Court that wishes to decide an
issue on the merits, these questions as to the scope of the Rule will not
arise, since there will be no conflict between the Justices voting to grant
certiorari and the majority of the Court. The third question, which fo-
cuses not on the actions of the Court but on those of an individual
Justice, arises whenever certiorari is granted on a less than unanimous
vote.
1. The Duty to Preserve Jurisdiction
The fullest recent exploration of the Rule of Four and the duties it
imposes on Justices who have voted to deny certiorari occurred three
Terms ago in a capital case, Darden v. Wainwright.1" Darden was
scheduled to be executed on September 4, 1985.0 He asked the Court
for a stay of execution pending the filing and disposition of his petition
for certiorari. On the afternoon of September 3, 1985, the Court denied
the application, by a vote of five to four.21 As is often the case with
a petitioner received due process in a deportation hearing and the petitioner will be
deported immediately if the order of deportation is not stayed, must the Justices who
did not vote to grant certiorari nonetheless vote to stay the deportation pending briefing,
argument, and decision?
1" The Court frequently dismisses a writ of certiorari as "improvidently granted."
See generally R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO, supra note 10, § 5.15, at 288-
89 (discussing the practice). Dismissal on this ground is colloquially referred to as a
"DIG."
If the answer to this second question is that the Court can DIG a case even when
the original four Justices who voted to grant continue to want to decide the case, a
negative answer to the first question should follow a fortiori. If Justices can act to
prevent the Court from hearing a case in which certiorari has been granted, certainly
they can allow the Court to lose jurisdiction through inaction. See infra notes 123-24
and accompanying text.
" 473 U.S. 927 (1985).
20 Id. at 927.
21 Chief Justice Burger concurred in the denial, explaining that the Court had
"had three prior opportunities to review the issues" raised in the stay application and
that those issues had been "thoroughly considered and resolved by federal and state
courts . . . ." Id. at 927-28 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented, filing their "form" dissent, see infra
note 28, that "the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment
prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments . . . ." Id. at 928 (Brennan &
Marshall, JJ., dissenting). Even though a petition for certiorari had not yet been dock-
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votes on stays, the Court did not explain the reasons for its decision.22
Later that day, Darden asked the Court to consider the papers
that he had filed in support of his application for a stay as a petition
for certiorari.2 3 Four Justices voted to grant certiorari;2 4 the petition
was therefore granted.
The Court, however, had already denied Darden's request for a
stay of execution. Because a grant of certiorari does not of its own force
operate as a stay,2" the grant of certiorari would have become essen-
tially an empty exercise unless the Court reversed its earlier decision:
Darden would have been executed shortly after midnight and the Court
would then have had to dismiss his claims as moot.26
Ultimately, the Court, again by a vote of five to four, granted a
stay.217 Justice Powell was the one Justice who voted to grant the stay
despite having voted to deny the petition for certiorari and the earlier
eted, they indicated that they would grant such a petition and vacate the death sentence.
Id. (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). Justices Blackmun and Stevens also dis-
sented. Because the Court had not yet reviewed the denial of Darden's first federal
habeas corpus petition, they believed that a stay should have been granted to permit the
Court to "consider whether to grant certiorari in the normal course of business." Id.
(Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
Thus, the lineup of the vote was as follows. For the stay: Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, Blackmun, and Stevens; against the stay: Chief Justice Burger and Justices
White, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor.
22 For example, in one recent period, from October 9 to October 19, 1987, the
Court denied stays in four cases and did not give reasons in any of those cases. Rosen-
thal v. State Bar, 108 S. Ct. 254 (1987); Lorenzini v. New Jersey, 108 S. Ct. 254
(1987); Daugherty v. Florida, 108 S. Ct. 221 (1987); Bell v. Lynaugh, 108 S. Ct. 221
(1987).
23 Darden, 473 U.S. at 928.
24 The Court virtually never reveals the number of votes in support of a petition
that has been granted. In this case, however, Justice Powell's separate opinion concur-
ring in the grant of a stay of execution provided this information. Id. at 928 (Powell,
J., concurring).
25 See R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO, supra note 10, § 17.10, at 674.
In Autry v. Estelle, 464 U.S. 1 (1983) (per curiam), the Court denied a stay of
execution in a capital case pending the filing of a petition for certiorari. Chief Justice
Burger and Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined the per curiam
opinion, which stated that "[hlad applicant convinced four Members of the Court that
certiorari would be granted on any of his claims, a stay would issue." Id. at 2. None-
theless, when later faced with a case in which certiorari was in fact
granted-Darden-four of these five Justices were unwilling to vote to issue a stay. See
infra note 27.
2 See, e.g., Straight v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2267 (1986) (dismissing petition
for certiorari as moot after petitioner was executed).
2 Four Justices indicated that they would not have granted a stay of execution:
Chief Justice Burger, who dissented both from the grant of certiorari and from the
grant of a stay, Darden, 473 U.S. at 929, and Justices White, Rehnquist, and
O'Connor, who indicated summarily that they would have denied a stay, id. at 928.
Thus, although Justice Powell was the only Justice to state on the record that he had
voted to stay the execution, it follows necessarily from the published votes that Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens also voted for a stay.
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stay application.28
Darden raises an important question about the nature of the obli-
gation to preserve the Court's jurisdiction. Four Justices-Chief Justice
Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor-implicitly took
the position that Justices who have voted to deny certiorari are under
no obligation to preserve the Court's jurisdiction over a case simply
because four of their colleagues have voted to hear it.29 They did not
explain the basis for this position or say when, if ever, Justices would
be under such an obligation.
Justice Powell took a quite different position. He explained that
he had voted to stay the execution, despite finding "no merit whatever
in any of the claims advanced in the petition for certiorari,""0 because
of "the unusual situation in which four Justices have voted to grant
certiorari . . . and in view of the fact that this is a capital case with
petitioner's life at stake, and further in view of the fact that the Justices
2" By piecing together the various public statements made by the Justices with
regard to the two stay applications and the petition for certiorari, it is possible to dis-
cern the actual lineup on the vote for certiorari. Justices Brennan and Marshall had
earlier voted to grant Darden's petition, even before it reached the Court. Darden, 473
U.S. at 928. Moreover, since Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), in which they
announced their view that the eighth and fourteenth amendments prohibit the death
penalty, id. at 227 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting), they
have consistently voted to grant certiorari in every capital case. See Kornhauser &
Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 111 n.39 (1986). Thus, it is clear that
they voted to grant certiorari in Darden.
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell voted to deny Darden's certiorari peti-
tion, which they each stated publicly to be meritless. Darden, 473 U.S. at 929 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting); id. at 928 (Powell, J., concurring).
We are left, then, with two groups of Justices who are "silent" on the vote to
grant-Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, who twice voted to deny the stay,
and Justices Blackmun and Stevens, who twice voted to grant it. See supra notes 21,
27.
While it might have made sense, in order to give full effect to the Rule of Four,
for Justices Blackmun and Stevens to vote to stay the execution even if they had voted
to deny the petition (as Justice Powell did), it would not have made sense for Justices
White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor to vote to grant a petition and then refuse to take a
step-staying the execution-necessary to make the grant meaningful. See supra text
accompanying note 26 (denial of stay would have been followed by dismissal of writ of
certiorari as moot). Thus, we can assume with considerable confidence that Justices
White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor did not vote to grant, leaving Justices Blackmun and
Stevens as the other two who did.
The lineup on the vote to grant would therefore be the following. To grant: Jus-
tices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens; to deny: Chief Justice Burger and
Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor.
2 See supra note 27. When the Supreme Court denies a stay in this posture, it is
unlikely that the grant of certiorari would lead a state court or a lower federal court to
grant such a stay.
30 Darden, 473 U.S. at 928 (Powell, J., concurring).
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are scattered geographically and unable to meet for a Conference
))31
Justice Powell's opinion points to two distinct considerations. To
the extent that it rests on the fact that the Court has granted certiorari
(and it is somewhat revealing of the conflict between the Rule of Four
and the majority that instead of writing that "the Court" has granted
certiorari, Justice Powell writes that "four Justices" have voted to do
so),32 it sets out a categorical rule.13 However, to the extent that it rests
on the two additional factors-that Darden's life was at stake and that
the Justices had voted by telephone rather than in conference-Justice
Powell's opinion evokes reliance on the standard by which Justices de-
termine whether to issue stays in their individual capacities-albeit in a
somewhat modified manner.
That standard embodies a four-part test:
First, it must be established that there is a "reasonable
probability" that four Justices will consider the issue suffi-
ciently meritorious to grant certiorari . . . . Second, the ap-
plicant must persuade [the Circuit Justice] that there is a
fair prospect that a majority of the Court will conclude that
the decision below was erroneous. . . . Third, there must be
a demonstration that irreparable harm is likely to result
from the denial of a stay. . . . And fourth, in a close case it
may be appropriate to "balance the equities"-to explore the
relative harms to applicant and respondent, as well as the
interests of the public at large. 4
In Darden, the first prong of the test was, of course, met: by the time
Justice Powell switched his vote, there was an absolute certainty that
four Justices would vote to grant. The first fact to which Justice Powell
referred-that Darden's life was at stake-clearly goes to, and satisfies,
the third prong of the test: it is hard to imagine a harm more irrepara-
31 Id. at 928-29 (Powell, J., concurring).
32 Cf Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 628 n.111 (1983)
(noting irony in the Court's emphasis that the opinion in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1
(1958), is "by" all nine Justices rather than "by" the Court).
"' But if Justice Powell intended to set out a categorical rule, his comment is
somewhat perplexing. It is simply not an "unusual situation" for four Justices to vote
to grant certiorari. See Stevens, supra note 4, at 17 (over 23% of petitions in 1979
Term, over 30% in 1980 Term, about 29% in 1981 Term were granted by only four
votes).
11 Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306, 1308 (1980) (Brennan, Circuit Justice);
see R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO, supra note 10, § 17.19, at 690 n.83
(citing cases applying the principles of Justice Brennan's test); see also Comment, Pre-
diction-Making in the Supreme Court: The Granting of Stays by Individual Justices,
32 UCLA L. REV. 1020, 1031 (1985) (discussing Justice Brennan's test).
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ble than death.
The real question, then, is whether, given the grant of certiorari,
the second prong-a "fair prospect" of reversal on the merits-drops
out of the equation. Clearly, in Justice Powell's formulation, it cannot
retain its full force: Justice Powell himself believed Darden's claims
had "no merit";85 he knew that Chief Justice Burger felt similarly;3"
and he knew that Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor were will-
ing to let Darden die without first resolving his claims even when faced
with the Court's decision to grant certiorari.3 7 Thus, it was hard to say
that Darden had a "fair prospect" of convincing the Court that the
judgment of the court below was erroneous.3 8 If the "fair prospect"
prong had been strictly applied, then Justice Powell should have voted
to deny the stay. But Justice Powell's reference to the fact that certio-
rari had been granted hastily and without a conference suggests, at
least implicitly, that the "fair prospect" prong played at least some role
in his decision. Indeed, the geographic dispersal of the Justices made it
unusually difficult to gauge the reason why the four Justices had voted
to grant, 9 thereby also making it more difficult to determine Darden's
prospect for success on the merits.
No conclusions can be drawn from the result in Darden itself re-
garding the views of Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Ste-
vens, who voted both for certiorari and for the stay.4 They may well
have voted for a stay only because they had voted for certiorari and
therefore wanted to hear the case. Unlike Justice Powell, they did not
face the question whether a Justice who has voted to deny certiorari
nonetheless has the duty to vote to stay a lower court's judgment so that
the Court has the opportunity to reach the merits of a granted case.
In a case closely related to Darden decided in the 1985 Term,
" Darden, 473 U.S. at 928 (Powell, J., concurring). This is an even stronger
position than Justices often have on cases where they have voted to deny certiorari. A
Justice may often be convinced that a lower court's decision is wrong without believing
that the issue is of sufficient importance to justify a place on the Court's plenary docket.
See infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
11 Darden, 473 U.S. at 929 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("I conclude that no issues
are presented that merit plenary review by this Court.").
17 See supra note 28.
'8 On the merits, Darden lost five to four, with Justice Powell writing the opinion
for the Court. Darden v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2464 (1986). Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented. Id. at 2476.
" See Schlesinger v. Holtzman, 414 U.S. 1321, 1323-24 (1973) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting) (stating, with regard to an order staying an injunction of bombing in Cambo-
dia: "Seriatim telephone calls cannot, with all respect, be a lawful substitute. A Confer-
ence brings us all together ... [T]he telephonic disposition of this grave and crucial
constitutional issue is not permissible.").
40 See supra notes 27-28.
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however, three of these four Justices did take an explicit position on
this issue.4 In an opinion joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun,
Justice Brennan stated:
[W]hen four vote to grant certiorari in a capital case, but
there is not a fifth vote to stay the scheduled execution, one
of the five Justices who does not believe the case certworthy
will nonetheless vote to stay; this is so that the "Rule of
Four" will not be rendered meaningless by an execution that
occurs before the Court considers the case on the merits.42
Even though this opinion was written in the context of a capital case,
its rationale might well apply more broadly to cases in which the denial
of a stay would lead to mootness, thereby making it impossible for the
Court to consider the merits of a case in which it had granted
certiorari.43
In summary, in recent Terms, four Justices-Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell-took the position that at least in
some cases the grant of certiorari on the basis of four votes compels
measures to protect the Court's jurisdiction; four Justices-Chief Jus-
tice Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor-took the
position that at least in some cases it does not; and Justice Stevens did
not address the issue. With the retirements of Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Powell, six of the sitting Justices have cast recorded votes, and
those votes are split three to three.
A second important issue raised by Darden concerns whether it is
ever appropriate for Justices disagreeing with the grant of certiorari to
assess the reasons that led their colleagues to vote to grant. If such an
inquiry is appropriate, it could have implications for the determination
41 Straight v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2004, 2006 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
This case, in which the Court denied a stay of execution despite the vote of four Jus-
tices to "hold," is discussed at greater length in Part II. See infra notes 179-99 and
accompanying text.
42 Straight, 106 S. Ct. at 2006 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
43 Whenever a petition must be dismissed as moot, the actions of the Justices who
voted to grant certiorari are "rendered meaningless." Id.
A curious element of Justice Brennan's position is that he suggests that only one of
five Justices who voted to deny need switch his vote to grant a stay. The principle
articulated by Justice Brennan, however, does not seem to depend on what these Jus-
tices think of the merits of the petition for certiorari or on the propriety of the votes of
their colleagues. Rather, it is stated as a blanket rule, which is triggered whenever four
Justices vote to grant certiorari. Thus, all five Justices who vote to deny should be in
the same position with respect to an obligation to protect the Court's jurisdiction; if
such an obligation attaches to one, it should attach to all. While Justice Brennan sug-
gests that under his position a capital case that received only four votes for certiorari
should be stayed on a five-to-four vote, in fact his rationale supports a nine-to-zero
vote.
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of when five Justices voting to deny can dismiss a petition that four
have granted or, as in Darden, refuse to take measures to protect the
Court's jurisdiction.
On this point, only one Justice reached the issue at the time certio-
rari and the stay were granted. In his dissent from the grant of certio-
rari, Chief Justice Burger stated explicitly that the petition presented
no issues that "merit plenary review.""" He suggested that it was an
"abuse of discretion" for four Justices to accept for review a petition
that, according to him, was "meritless." '45 Chief Justice Burger's opin-
ion suggested that his vote to deny the stay rested on his assessment of
the justifiability of his four colleagues' votes to grant certiorari.
In light of the nature of the Court's discretionary jurisdiction, it is
far from self-evident what "abuse of discretion" means. As the Court
has recognized in the area of administrative law, a decisionmaker's ac-
tion cannot constitute an abuse of discretion where there is "no law to
apply." '46 The discretion of an individual Justice in voting on petitions
for certiorari is narrowed neither by statute nor by Court rule. The
relevant statutes prescribe only the jurisdictional prerequisites to certio-
rari.4 They say nothing about how the Court should pick, from the
many cases that meet those prerequisites, the few that it considers espe-
cially worthy of review on the merits. And, the Court has done nothing
to cabin significantly the discretion accorded it.4 Thus, even if a Jus-
tice determines that a petition does not present a compelling case for
review under any of the listed factors, it is difficult to see how he could
conclude that the votes of four colleagues to grant certiorari constituted
an abuse of discretion.
Another problem with Chief Justice Burger's position that a vote
" Darden, 473 U.S. at 929 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
45 Id.
4' Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830-31 (1985). The Administrative Proce-
dure Act ("APA") provides that judicial review is not available where "statutes pre-
clude judicial review" or where "agency action is committed to agency discretion by
law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1982). In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402 (1971), the Court determined that the exception for "'action committed
to agency discretion' . . . is a very narrow exception. The legislative history of the
[APA] indicates that it is applicable in those rare instances where 'statutes are drawn in
such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.'" Id. at 410 (emphasis
added) (citation omitted).
In administrative law, the "no law to apply" standard comes into play "if the
statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to
judge the agency's exercise of discretion." Chaney, 470 U.S. at 830. But where such
standards exist, it is proper to review an agency's exercise of its discretion for "abuse of
discretion." See, e.g., id.; Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 41 (1983).
"I See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257-1259 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
48 See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
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to grant certiorari can constitute an "abuse of discretion" is that the
Court has never adopted a requirement that the Justices ex-
plain-either publicly or to their colleagues-the reasons underlying
their votes on certiorari petitions.49 As indicated above, the Chief Jus-
tice's conclusion that his four colleagues had erred in granting certiorari
was premised exclusively on his view that, on the merits, the claims
should be rejected by the Court.5 Nothing in the public record sug-
gests, however, that the Justices who voted to grant certiorari did so
exclusively because they believed that the lower court's judgment was
wrong.51
Thus, even if the factors listed in Rule 17 were the exclusive fac-
tors to guide the Court's decisions on certiorari, it may be that, consis-
tent with Rule 17, the granting Justices determined that a decision on
the merits would have, for example, "the purpose of expounding and
stabilizing principles of law for the benefit of the people of the coun-
try.'2 Unless each Justice is required to explain the basis for his deci-
sion to grant certiorari, it is impossible for other Justices to determine
whether the votes to grant were an abuse of discretion. 3
49 See R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO, supra note 10, § 5.5, at 264. In
Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912 (1950), Justice Frankfurter,
discussing the reasons why the Court does not require Justices to explain denials of
petitions for certiorari, stated:
[I]t has been.suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its rea-
sons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the Court
may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties, Congress has placed
the control of the Court's business, in effect, within the Court's discretion.
...If the Court is to do its work it would not be feasible to give reasons,
however brief, for refusing to take these cases. The time that would be
required is prohibitive, apart from the fact . . . that different reasons not
infrequently move different members of the Court in concluding that a
particular case at a particular time makes review undesirable.
Id. at 918.
1o He made this point even more clearly in a concurrence in the Court's rejection
of Darden's substantive claims, in which he stated: "I voted to deny the petition in this
extraordinary case because the meritless claims raised did not require plenary review.
Full briefing and oral argument have not changed my views." Darden v. Wainwright,
106 S. Ct. 2464, 2475 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
51 This is not to say that the Justices are wholly uninformed as to why their
colleagues might have voted to grant certiorari. As Justice Stevens has indicated, "law
clerks prepare so-called 'pool memos' that are used by several justices in evaluating
certiorari petitions." Stevens, supra note 4, at 13-14; see D. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER
183 (1986) ("[I]n 1972, at the suggestion of [Justicel Powell, the 'cert. pool' was estab-
lished. Six of the Justices now share their collective law clerks' memos . . . ."). Pre-
sumably, as to Justices in this pool, the reasons for their votes to grant certiorari will
often be those given in the "pool memos."
52 1922 House Hearings, supra note 13, at 2 (statement of Chief Justice Taft).
53 It is possible, of course, that a Justice will explain his vote in conference. But
he certainly is not required to do so. See infra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
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2. The Ability to Prevent a Decision
Several times each Term, the Court declines to decide cases on
which it has granted certiorari, on the grounds that the grant had been
"improvident." 4 Such a dismissal, like the decision to give plenary con-
sideration in the first place, rests wholly within the Court's discretion. 5
IThe most common explanation for such dismissals (or "DIG"s)5"
is that it is either impossible or inappropriate for the Court to issue a
decision on the merits. Briefing, oral argument, or further research by
the Court may reveal that the case does not squarely present the issue
on which certiorari was granted. Or, changed circumstances may di-
minish the importance of the issue involved."8
Because the Court has the ability to DIG, a grant of certiorari is
not irrevocable. Thus, whatever a grant of certiorari entails, it does not
entail a categorical obligation that the Court decide a case on the mer-
its-that is, determine whether the judgment below should be affirmed
or reversed.5 9 Even if a grant of certiorari were unanimous, the Court
would retain the ability to divest itself of jurisdiction.
The question therefore arises as to the relationship between the
vote to grant certiorari and the vote to DIG. If the Court were to vote
to grant unanimously, and then were to vote to DIG unanimously,
there would be no problem. But if four Justices continue to want to
hear and decide a case on the merits, then the power of the majority to
DIG comes into conflict with the power of the minority under the Rule
of Four."
" In the first six months of 1987, for example, the Court dismissed six cases. See
California v. Rooney, 107 S. Ct. 2852 (1987); Van Drasek v. Webb, 107 S. Ct. 2171
(1987); Lynaugh v. Petty, 107 S. Ct. 1596 (1987); Missouri v. Blair, 107 S. Ct. 1596
(1987); United States v. Merchant, 107 S. Ct. 1596 (1987); City of Springfield v.
Kibbe, 107 S. Ct. 1114 (1987).
51 See R. STERN, B. GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO, supra note 10, § 5.15, at 288-93.
51 See supra note 18.
5 See infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
38 See infra notes 82-89 and accompanying text. If the changed circumstances
render the case moot or otherwise deprive the Court of jurisdiction, the writ of certio-
rari will be dismissed on those grounds, rather than on the ground that certiorari was
improvidently granted. See R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO, supra note 10,
§ 18.5, at 722-24 (discussing cases).
" A DIG, which could be viewed as an abstention on that question, is not a
decision on the merits. The legal effect of a DIG is equivalent to that of a denial of
certiorari, that is, it has no precedential effect. See R. STERN, B. GRESSMAN & S.
SHAPIRO, supra note 10, § 5.7, at 269-70. But cf. Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari
Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1302-05 (1979) (suggesting that denials of certio-
rari can, in some cases, be indicative of the Court's views on the merits).
6 Because the power to grant certiorari clearly is not irrevocable, nor should it be,
if six Justices want to DIG (and therefore only three want to hear a case), the conflict,
while no doubt real, does not implicate the Rule of Four.
[Vol. 136:1067
NONMAJORITY RULES
On a number of occasions, four Justices have dissented from a
DIG. This Section examines three instances in which the Court ad-
dressed explicitly the conflict between the power to DIG and the Rule
of Four: a series of cases decided in 1957 in which the Court considered
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting employees' tort claims under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA") ending with Ferguson
v. Moore-McCormack Lines;6 Triangle Improvement Council v.
Ritchie;62 and New York v. Uplinger.3
In the FELA cases, the Court addressed the merits. Justice Frank-
furter dissented, arguing that, as a matter of sound judicial policy, the
Court should refuse to hear employer liability cases that involved only
sufficiency of the evidence determinations. He therefore voted to dismiss
certiorari as improvidently granted.64
In his dissent, Justice Frankfurter took issue with the proposition
that "the 'integrity of the certiorari process' as expressed in the 'rule of
four' . . requires all the Justices to vote on the merits of a case when
four Justices have voted to grant certiorari and no new factor emerges
after argument and deliberation."6 He maintained that the initial deci-
sion to grant certiorari "must necessarily be based on a limited appreci-
ation of the issues in a case, resting as it so largely does on the partisan
claims in briefs of counsel."6' 6 After hearing oral argument and deliber-
ating on a case, a Justice may well conclude that it would be inadvisa-
ble for the Court to address the merits.6" Under this rationale, five Jus-
tices could dismiss certiorari, following oral argument, even if their four
colleagues still wanted to decide the case on the merits. The Rule of
Four, then, is one in which a miriority of Justices can bind the majority
in the presence of the incomplete information available when the certio-
rari petition is considered, perhaps even because of the incompleteness
of the information, but cannot do so once the Justices have given fur-
ther consideration to the case.
Anticipating the criticism that dismissing a writ of certiorari in a
case that four Justices still wanted to decide would turn the Rule of
Four into a Rule of Five, at least in the postargument period, Justice
61 352 U.S. 521 (1957). The other cases in this series were: Rogers v. Missouri
Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957); Webb v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 352 U.S. 512 (1957);
Herdman v. Pennsylvania R.R., 352 U.S. 518 (1957).
62 402 U.S. 497 (1971) (per curiam).
63 467 U.S. 246 (1984) (per curiam).
" Ferguson, 352 U.S. at 524 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
8" Id. at 527 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
86 Id.
67 See id. at 528 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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Frankfurter stated:
No Justice is likely to vote to dismiss a writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted after argument has been heard ....
In the usual instance, a doubting Justice respects the judg-
ment of his brethren that the case does concern issues impor-
tant enough for the Court's consideration and adjudication.
But a different situation is presented when a class of cases is
systematically taken for review. Then a Justice who believes
. . . that an increasing amount of the Court's time is unduly
drained by adjudication of these cases cannot forego his duty
to voice his dissent to the Court's action.68
Thus, there would be a presumption in favor of a decision on the
merits.
In summary, Justice Frankfurter provides two independent expla-
nations for why his interpretation of the Rule of Four does not turn it
into a Rule of Five. First, the Rule of Four loses force only after the
Court has been briefed on the merits and heard oral argument. Second,
once four Justices have voted to grant certiorari, their decision gains a
claim to deference; five Justices cannot disturb it merely because, in the
first instance, they would have reached the contrary conclusion.
In a concurring opinion joined in pertinent part by six other Jus-
tices, Justice Harlan, who agreed with Justice Frankfurter that the
FELA cases should not be reviewed, nonetheless took issue with Justice
Frankfurter's position on the nature of the Rule of Four.69 He argued
that
due adherence to [this] rule requires that once certiorari has
been granted a case should be disposed of on the premise
that it is properly here, in the absence of considerations ap-
pearing which were not manifest or fully apprehended at the
time certiorari was granted ...
I do not think that, in the absence of the considerations
mentioned, voting to dismiss a writ after it has been granted
can be justified on the basis of an inherent right of dissent.
In the case of a petition for certiorari that right, it seems to
me-again without the presence of intervening factors-is
exhausted once the petition has been granted and the cause
set for argument. 0
68 Id. at 528-29 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
68 See id. at 559 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
7' Id. at 559-60 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting); see also Leiman, supra
note 5, at 975-77 (discussing the two views of the Rule).
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Justice Harlan challenged Justice Frankfurter's assertion that five
Justices have the right to dismiss, after oral argument, a petition that
four had granted.71 He argued that "permitting the. . . writ to be thus
undone would undermine the whole philosophy of the 'rule of four,'
which is that any case warranting consideration in the opinion of such
a substantial minority of the Court will be taken and disposed of.'' 2
He thus articulated a blanket rule compelling a decision in the
absence of "intervening factors."' 73 Justice Harlan's reference to this ex-
ception, however, contains an important ambiguity: who is to decide the
relevance of those factors-the five who had voted to deny or at least
one of the four who had voted to grant ?
7
The Court addressed this question in 1971, in Triangle Improve-
ment Council v. Ritchie. The plaintiffs in that case had challenged the
condemnation of their houses, which stood in the path of a planned
interstate highway. They claimed that the state road commission had
failed to comply with the requirement of the Federal-Aid Highway Act
of 1968 concerning the duty "to provide for the 'prompt and equitable
relocation and reestablishment of persons' displaced by federal highway
programs," 75 and thus that the Secretary of Transportation could not
approve the proposed project. The district court, relying on the then-
71 This case generated some amusing correspondence between Justices Frank-
furter and Harlan. In response to the circulation of a draft of Justice Harlan's opinion,
Justice Frankfurter sent him a handwritten note stating: "Will you take me up on my
offer of a bet that the rest of you-including Black, J., yourself & Douglas, J.-have at
one time or another disregarded 'the integrity of the certiorari process'?" Letter from
Justice Frankfurter to Justice Harlan (undated) (on file with the University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review).
Justice Harlan agreed, calling this "a good sporting proposition" and stating, as
one of the terms of the bet, that "[t]he bet will be a lunch at that nice fish place."
Justice Harlan also added: "The actions of Brothers Black and Douglas are to be ex-
cluded from the bet because (a) even though junior, I am not bound by their actions
and (b) I already know of instances where they have 'violated' the 'integrity' rule."
Letter from Justice Harlan to Justice Frankfurter (Feb. 21, 1957) (on file with the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review). We have not been able to determine who
won the bet.
We are grateful for the assistance of the curators of the John Marshall Harlan
Papers at the Princeton University Library.
72 Ferguson, 352 U.S. at 560 (Harlan J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasis
added); see Leiman, supra note 5, at 975-76. Referring to Justice Harlan's criticism of
Justice Frankfurter, which was joined by six of his colleagues, one commentator stated:
"The language may have been legal, but the intent was obviously lethal. Clearly the
Brothers had committed fratricide on one of their number." Berman, The Case of Jus-
tice Frankfurter, 2 N.J. ST. B.J. 149, 169 (1958).
73 Ferguson, 352 U.S. at 562 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
74 It is also possible, of course, that the five Justices who vote to DIG will be
different from the five who initially voted to deny certiorari. But, for the purposes of
this discussion, it is assumed that they are the same.
75 Triangle Improvement Council v. Ritchie, 429 F.2d 423, 424 (4th Cir. 1970)
(Sobeloff, J., dissenting) (quoting 23 U.S.C. § 501 (repealed 1971)).
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existing interpretation of the Federal-Aid Highway Act, ruled that
these requirements were inapplicable to the Triangle project because
the project had been authorized prior to the passage of the Act."8
Subsequent to the district court's decision, the Secretary of Trans-
portation issued new guidelines, which applied the Act's requirements
to all projects, even those authorized before the Act's passage." None-
theless, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's opinion in a
one-sentence per curiam, and denied rehearing and rehearing en
banc. 8
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, with only four Justices
voting to grant,79 on the questidn whether either the Act or administra-
tive regulations applied to projects begun prior to the Act's effective
date. After briefing and oral argument, however, certiorari was dis-
missed as improvidently granted.8" The five Justices who had originally
voted to deny now voted to DIG; the four Justices who had originally
voted to grant now dissented.8 '
Four of the five Justices who voted to DIG remained silent as to
the reasons for their decision. But Justice Harlan, in an opinion con-
curring in the dismissal, provided four justifications for his vote.82 First,
the Federal-Aid Highway Act had been repealed since the grant of cer-
tiorari, and thus interpreting its scope was no longer an important is-
sue. 3 Second, the Act had been replaced by the Uniform Relocation
Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970."4 The
1970 Act was closely modeled on the substantive provisions of the 1968
Act, and this factor "alter[ed] drastically the potential impact of any
decision [the Court] might reach in this case." ' Justice Harlan be-
lieved it unwise to interpret those provisions without first affording the
lower courts a chance to consider the impact on a wide range of af-
fected agencies.8" Third, by the time of oral argument, less than ten
78 See Triangle Improvement Council v. Ritchie, 314 F. Supp. 20, 28-29 (S.D.W.
Va. 1969).
"' See Triangle Improvement Council, 429 F.2d at 425-26 (Sobeloff, J.,
dissenting).
78 Id. at 423 (per curiam).
Although the Court rarely reveals the actual votes at the certiorari stage in a
granted case, see supra note 24, Justice Douglas makes this statement in his dissent
from the DIG. Triangle Improvement Council, 402 U.S. at 508 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
80 See id. at 497 (per curiam).
See id. at 508 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
82 See id. at 497 (Harlan, J., concurring).
a See id.
a See id. at 498-99 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring).
See id. at 500-01 (Harlan, J., concurring).
[Vol. 136:1067
NONMAJORITY RULES
residents of the Triangle remained to be relocated; that only these per-
sons would be affected by the decision, in Justice Harlan's view, "ren-
ders this case. . . a classic instance of a situation where the exercise of
our powers of review would be of no significant continuing national
import. '817 Finally, petitioners had significantly broadened their claims
in their brief on the merits to challenge not simply the failure to pro-
duce a formal relocation plan but also to claim that in fact given indi-
viduals had not been properly relocated. Since this issue had not been
determined by the trial and appeals courts, Justice Harlan believed it
inappropriate for the Supreme Court to reach it.88
In a dissent joined by Justices Black, Brennan, and Marshall, Jus-
tice Douglas claimed that the integrity of the Rule of Four had been
impaired by the Court's dismissal of certiorari over the continuing votes
of four Justices to hear the case:
This petition should not be dismissed as improvidently
granted. Our "rule of four" allows any four Justices to vote
to grant certiorari and set the case for consideration on the
merits. The four who now dissent were the only ones to vote
to grant the petition. The rule should not be changed to a
"rule of five" by actions of the five Justices who originally
opposed certiorari. It is improper for them to dismiss the
case after oral argument unless one of the four who voted to
grant moves so to do, which has not occurred here. . . . [I]t
is the duty of the five opposing certiorari to persuade others
at Conference, but, failing that, to vote on the merits of the
case.
89
87 Id. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring).
88 Id. at 501-02 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan's argument was a pru-
dential one. Certainly, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to decide the case. See supra
note 58. It was Justice Harlan's view, however, that for the Court to address the merits
would be an improper exercise of its discretion to determine which cases within its
certiorari jurisdiction merit its limited decisional resources.
819 Id. at 508 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas had originally articulated
this position in United States v. Shannon, 342 U.S. 288 (1952):
The suggestion that the writ be dismissed as improvidently granted raises
a recurring problem in the administration of the business of the Court. A
Justice who has voted to deny the writ of certiorari is in no position after
argument to vote to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. Only those
who have voted to grant the writ have that privilege.
Id. at 298 (Douglas, J., dissenting). One year after Triangle Improvement Council,
however, Justice Douglas took quite a different approach: "We should 'dismiss as im-
providently granted' only in exceptional circumstances and where all nine members of
the Court agree. In all other cases the merits of the controversy should be decided."
Iowa Beef Packers, Inc. v. Thompson, 405.U.S. 228, 232 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing) (the remaining eight Justices joined a per curiam opinion dismissing certiorari).
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The dissenters in Triangle Improvement Council treated the Rule of
Four as having continuing force even after briefing and oral argument:
as long as four Justices wish to reach the merits, the Court as a whole
must follow suit. In short, the dissenters argued, the majority must per-
suade one of the Justices who voted to grant certiorari that changed
circumstances render proceeding to a decision on the merits
inappropriate.
In 1984, the Court returned once again to the question of who can
properly find "changed circumstances" justifying dismissal. In New
York v. Uplinger, the New York Court of Appeals had struck down a
state statute prohibiting loitering for the purpose of soliciting others to
engage in various sexual activities." The Supreme Court granted a pe-
tition filed by the District Attorney of Erie County challenging the
state court's analysis of the federal constitutional question., Ulti-
mately, after briefing and oral argument, the Court dismissed the writ
as improvidently granted.92 In a brief per curiam opinion joined by
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, the Court
stated that it was "uncertain as to the precise federal constitutional is-
sue the [state] court decided,"9" noted that the state court's analysis in
Uplinger rested substantially on an earlier decision whose correctness
the petitioner in Uplinger had declined to challenge,94 and treated the
postgrant filing of an amicus brief by the Attorney General of New
York attacking the statute's constitutionality as a changed circumstance
detracting from the desirability of review. 5
The four Justices who dissented from the per curiam stated simply
that "the New York statute was invalidated on federal constitutional
grounds, and the merits of that decision are properly before us and
should be addressed. Dismissing this case as improvidently granted is
not the proper course." 96
90 467 U.S. at 247.
01 See id. at 247 n.1.
92 See id. at 249.
93 Id. at 248.
"' See id. at 249.
95 See id. at 247-48 n.1 ("The . . . conflict in the positions taken by petitioner
and the New York State Attorney General, a circumstance which 'was not ... fully
apprehended at the time certiorari was granted,' provides a strong additional reason for
our conclusion that the grant of certiorari was improvident." (citation omitted)).
96 Id. at 252 (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist & O'Connor, JJ.,
dissenting).
Triangle Improvement Council and Uplinger are not the only cases in which cer-
tiorari was dismissed over four dissenting votes. See, e.g., City of Springfield v. Kibbe,
107 S. Ct. 1114 (1987); Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 520 (1971); Miller v. Califor-
nia, 392 U.S. 616 (1968); NAACP v. Overstreet, 384 U.S. 118 (1966); The Monrosa
v. Carbon Black Export, Inc., 359 U.S. 180 (1959); Ellis v. Dixon, 349 U.S. 458
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In an opinion concurring in the dismissal of certiorari, Justice Ste-
vens provided an expansive view of the power of five Justices to trump
the Rule of Four.97 Unlike Justice Harlan in Triangle Improvement
Council, who had noted the "changed posture" of the particular case
before him,98 Justice Stevens claimed that "there is always an impor-
tant intervening development that may be decisive,"" namely, the
closer scrutiny given to cases after the grant of certiorari. While he
recognized a presumption that the grant of certiorari will lead to a deci-
sion on the merits, even when "the majority may remain convinced that
the case does not present a question of general significance warranting
this Court's review,"1 ' Justice Stevens identified a "jurisprudential"
institutional consideration for removing the .power to force a decision
from a group of only four Justices and vesting it instead in the
majority:
The decision to decide a constitutional question may be the
most momentous decision that can be made in a case. Funda-
mental principles of constitutional adjudication counsel
against premature consideration of constitutional questions
and demand that such questions be presented in a context
conducive to the most searching analysis possible. . . . If a
majority is convinced after studying the case that its posture,
record or presentation of issues makes it an unwise vehicle
for exercising the "gravest and most delicate" function that
this Court is called upon to perform, the Rule of Four
should not reach so far as to compel the majority to decide
the case."0 '
Justice Stevens thus asserts that five Justices have the authority to dis-
miss certiorari if they believe that it would be inappropriate to decide
the case, regardless of the views of the minority.
Justice Stevens's view of the Rule of Four distinguishes between
"the power to require that a case be briefed, argued, and considered at
a postargument conference," which the Rule of Four vests in four Jus-
tices,10 2 and "the power to command that [a case's] merits be decided by
the Court," which remains with the majority. 0 ' For him, the "force [of
(1955); Hammerstein v. Superior Court, 341 U.S. 491 (1951).
Uplinger, 467 U.S. at 249 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Triangle Improvement Council, 402 U.S. at 502 (Harlan, J., concurring).
O Uplinger, 467 U.S. at 250 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
'00 Id. at 251 (Stevens, J., concurring).
101 Id. (citation omitted).
102 Id. at 250 (Stevens, J., concurring).
103 Id.
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the Rule of Four] is largely spent once the case has been heard."1 4
Through a somewhat similar route, Justice Stevens thus arrives at the
same conclusion that Justice Frankfurter had reached in the FELA
cases. 
1 0 5
From Justice Stevens's perspective, briefing and argument should
change the number of Justices able to force the Court to continue con-
sidering the case from four Justices (who can grant certiorari despite
the opposition of their five colleagues) to five Justices (who must want
to address the merits for the Court actually to render such a decision).
Also, briefing and argument should change the reasons that can legiti-
mately be asserted to prevent a decision. At the certiorari stage, a Jus-
tice can properly argue that while the legal system would benefit from
the Court's guidance on the issue, it would not benefit sufficiently to
justify the Court's expenditure of its limited decisional resources. But
by the time a case has been briefed and argued, many of the resources
necessary to decide the case have already been expended. 0 6 Thus, the
proper question at that stage is whether the benefits from a decision
justify the expenditure of the costs necessary to produce such a deci-
sion.107 In many cases, therefore, Justices who opposed the grant of
certiorari should favor a decision on the merits once a case has been
briefed and argued.
Moreover, the Court's perception of the benefits from a decision
on the merits may be quite different after oral argument than it was at
the certiorari stage. It is the benefits estimated after oral argument that
should enter the calculus to determine whether a case should be decided
on the merits. Thus, when a case is dismissed after oral argument, it
may sometimes be a misnomer to say that certiorari was "improvidently
granted." Indeed, decisions to grant certiorari that, ex ante, seemed de-
sirable may turn out, ex post, to have been mistakes.
In summary, under Justice Stevens's approach, the certiorari pro-
cess has two steps. At the first step, four Justices can make the initial
determination whether the benefits from a decision on the merits justify
104 Id. at 251 (Stevens, J., concurring).
101 See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
108 See Uplinger, 467 U.S. at 250-51 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[O]nce a case has
been briefed, argued, and studied in chambers, sound principles of judicial economy
normally outweigh most reasons advanced for dismissing a case.").
107 Id. at 251 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens apparently posits an ex-
ample in which five Justices become convinced after argument that there would be no
benefit, but rather a detriment, from a decision on the merits. For example, an issue
may be presented in a manner that is poorly suited for meaningful consideration. But
Justice Stevens's argument should also compel dismissal where there would be a benefit
from a decision, but where that benefit would be insufficient to warrant the expendi-
ture of the costs necessary to produce such a decision.
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the expenditure of the decisional costs involved in scheduling, *briefing,
and oral argument. But at the second step, after oral argument, it is up
to five Justices to reevaluate the benefits of a decision on the merits and
establish whether the Court should expend the remaining costs neces-
sary to produce such a decision.
There is a certain paradox in the general approach taken by Jus-
tice. Harlan's opinion in Triangle Improvement Council and by the per
curiam opinion in Uplinger: if four Justices still want to hear a case
and render a decision on the merits, then it is difficult to assert that
there has been a "changed circumstance" since the vote to grant. Even
if the petition in Triangle Improvement Council had been filed after
the repeal of the Federal-Aid Highway Act, had involved only the
rights of ten individuals, and had raised broader questions not actually
decided by the lower courts,10 8 four Justices could have voted to grant
the petition. Similarly, in Uplinger, even if the Attorney General of
New York had filed a brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari,
the federal issue had been murky, and the petitioner had made clear at
the petition stage the relationship between his claims and the earlier
decision,1"' four Justices might have thought the case worthy of certio-
rari. Neither Triangle Improvement Council nor Uplinger explains
why such circumstances are relevant to the decision to dismiss certiorari
merely because they became apparent after, rather than before, the vote
to grant. In an important sense, then, the converse of Justice Stevens's
assertion that "there is always an important intervening development
that may be decisive" is also true: to the extent that four Justices wish
to decide a case, there has been no change in circumstances that is rele-
vant to whether the Court has an obligation to rule on the merits.
Moreover, if five Justices believe that particular factors make the
grant of certiorari undesirable, there may be stronger reasons for them
to vote to dismiss if those factors are present at the time of the Court's
vote on the petition than if they appear later. If a dismissal immedi-
ately follows the grant of certiorari, neither the parties nor the Court
will have invested any resources in the consideration of the merits of
the case. In contrast, if it occurs at a later time, they will have done
SO.11
0
108 See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
109 See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
110 Triangle Improvement Council, 402 U.S. at 508 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("It
would save time and money if the five would dismiss as improvidently granted immedi-
ately after certiorari is granted rather than waiting for briefs and oral argument.");
Ferguson, 352 U.S. at 560 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting) ("It would be pref-
erable to have the vote of annulment come into play the moment after the petition for
certiorari has been granted, since then at least the litigants would be spared useless
1988]
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This is not to say that the Court's exercise of its certiorari jurisdic-
tion should be guided by the interests of the parties before it-a factor
that Chief Justice Taft expressly disavowed in his 1922 testimony.
111
But from the Court's viewpoint, the expenditure of resources may be
relevant. Indeed, as indicated above, once some resources have been ex-
pended in a case, the calculus changes to whether the benefits from a
decision justify the costs that have yet to be expended, rather than
whether such benefits justify the total costs calculated from the time
certiorari was granted."'
Justice Harlan himself had recognized in the FELA cases that if
dismissal "were proper, it would be preferable to have the vote of an-
nulment come into play the moment after the petition for certiorari has
been granted," rather than later. 1 3 Yet, ironically, his analysis of the
relevance of changed circumstances in Triangle Improvement Coun-
cil" 4 leads to precisely the opposite conclusion-that five Justices can
dismiss a petition after the passage of some time for reasons that would
not have been legitimate if invoked immediately following the grant.
Thus, the middle position advocated by Justice Harlan in Trian-
gle Improvement Council and by the per curiam opinion in Uplinger
lacks any claim to intellectual legitimacy. It is surprising, then, that the
two other competing positions-the strong argument against dismissal
articulated by Justice Douglas in Triangle Improvement Council, and
the strong argument for dismissal articulated by Justice Frankfurter in
the FELA cases and by Justice Stevens in Uplinger-have been re-
jected by a majority of the Court.
The discussion of the three cases also reveals the inconsistencies in
the Court's approach to the question of when five Justices can dismiss
a petition for certiorari that four have granted. Justice Harlan's posi-
tion in Triangle Improvement Council, which was apparently accepted
by a majority of the Court, and that of the per curiam in Uplinger, are
directly at odds with Justice Harlan's own approach in the FELA
cases, which also received majority support. Indeed, if five Justices who
voted to deny can rely on changed circumstances since the Court's grant
effort in briefing and preparing for the argument of their cases.").
... See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
..2 See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text. It is true, of course, that de-
spite the expenditure of such resources, the Court may be precluded from issuing a
decision by the parties' agreement to settle the case. When a pending case is settled, the
Court dismisses the petition under Rule 53. See Sup. CT. R. 53.
113 Ferguson, 352 U.S. at 560 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
114 Triangle Improvement Council, 402 U.S. at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring)




as the basis for dismissal, then five Justices who disagree with the grant
of certiorari should be able to dismiss immediately following that grant.
Changed circumstances should be cognizable only if they convince at
least one Justice who originally voted to grant certiorari that his earlier
decision is no longer appropriate, leaving fewer than four Justices in
favor of a decision on the merits. 15
In addition, the primacy accorded the analysis of changed circum-
stances in Justice Harlan's opinion in Triangle Improvement Council
and in the per curiam opinion in Uplinger, like Chief Justice Burger's
analysis of the abuse of discretion question in his dissent in Darden,11
is inconsistent with the Court's failure to require each Justice to ex-
plain his vote to grant certiorari.11 7 Indeed, it is indefensible to main-
tain that a change in circumstances may be invoked to dismiss certiorari
if those circumstances were irrelevant to the initial decision to grant
certiorari." 8 But if the Justices who voted to deny certiorari can legiti-
mately assess, at a later time, whether changed circumstances weaken
the reasons why certiorari was granted, they will have to know the
basis for their colleagues' vote to grant. Justices, however, are under no
obligation to make such reasons public, and, in fact, at least four Jus-
tices have maintained that such an obligation would be undesirable." 9
115 See supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Douglas's
position).
Such an approach would be consistent with the Court's own rule concerning re-
hearings of cases decided on the merits: "A petition for rehearing ...will not be
granted except at the instance of a Justice who concurred in the judgment or decision
and with the concurrence of a majority of the Court." Sup. CT. R. 51.1.
"1 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
117 See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
118 For example, if the age of a criminal defendant is irrelevant to the issues
raised in the challenge to his conviction, surely certiorari cannot be dismissed merely
because the defendant is a few months older than he was when certiorari was granted.
119 In Darden v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2464 (1986), Justice Blackmun criticized
Chief Justice Burger for having filed a dissent from the grant of certiorari. Id. at 2484
n.9 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, JJ., dissenting). He ar-
gued that the Chief Justice, in his dissent, "irrevocably had committed himself to re-
jecting [Darden's] claims before he had received -the benefit of the full briefing, oral
argument, access to the record, and discussion of the issues by other Members of the
Court that followed [the] grant of certiorari." Id.; see also Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price,
360 U.S. 246, 247 n.1 (1959) (Brennan, J., mem.) (discussed infra note 173).
Similarly, a public explanation of a vote to grant certiorari could involve a pre-
judgment of the petitioner's arguments-for example, when a Justice states that his
vote is motivated by a desire to overrule one of the court's precedents. See infra notes
148-50 and accompanying text.
The problem of prejudgment could be avoided, of course, if the Justices' reasons
for granting certiorari were not made public. But this option would also present serious
drawbacks. First, forcing a Justice to articulate reasons for voting to grant certiorari,
even reasons that are not made public, is a substantial imposition on his time. See
supra note 49. Second, not making the reasons public would have the effect of creating
a body of secret law, a feature that is quite alien to our system of adjudication.
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Finally, it is noteworthy that the inconsistency and incoherence ex-
hibited by the Court are not solely the product of a change in person-
nel, 2 ° as, over the years, individual Justices have taken inconsistent
and incoherent positions on these issues. 2 ' The case of Justice Harlan
has already been discussed.' 22 In addition, Justices Brennan and Mar-
120 Moreover, inconsistency and incoherence are not a product of the aggregation
of the Justices' preferences. See Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 802, 813-32 (1982). Relying on Kenneth Arrow's famous theorem on collective
choice, see K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963), Pro-
fessor (now Judge) Easterbrook posits a decisional model in which the Justices make
comparisons among pairs of different legal rules. For example, suppose that there are
three plausible formulations of the rule governing dismissals of certiorari petitions in
cases in which four Justices want the Court to issue a decision on the merits: under
rule A, a petition can be dismissed only immediately following the grant; under rule B,
a petition can be dismissed only if there are external "intervening circumstances"; and
under rule C, a petition can be dismissed only after oral argument. The Justices are
asked to rank the three rules, that is, to vote on whether they prefer A to B, B to C,
and C to A. Easterbrook argues that, "[f]irst, decisions produced by voting will tend to
be unstable even when the same voters participate in all decisions; second, the sequence
in which issues are decided frequently controls the outcome of the process; third, any
voting system can be manipulated by people who do not honestly state their positions."
Easterbrook, supra, at 814-15.
Easterbrook's decisional model does not accurately portray the mechanism by
which the Justices select legal rules. Justices are not asked to consider competing rules
pairwise, and to provide a full ranking of all plausible rules. Instead, they are simply
asked to select, from among such rules, the single rule that they deem most desirable.
See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 28, at 109 n.37. This process does not lead to the
problems identified by Easterbrook. Id. at 109.
In addition, Easterbrook's model is not a desirable model of adjudication. As
Professors Kornhauser and Sager point out, "although courts might adopt a mechanism
that did produce a complete ranking of alternatives, it seems silly to do so when such a
choice has no' apparent benefits and plunges one into the antinomies of Arrow's theo-
rem." Id. at 109 n.37.
In any event, however, the problem that we focus on is a more basic one: that
individual Justices act in an inconsistent and incoherent manner. Consistency and co-
herence on the part of individual Justices are necessary conditions for consistency and
coherence on the part of the Court. On the question of whether such conditions are also
sufficient, compare Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 28, at 111 (consistency by individ-
ual Justices a sufficient condition for consistency by the Court, but coherence by indi-
vidual Justices not a sufficient condition for coherence by the Court) with Easterbrook,
supra, at 815-21 (Court can act inconsistently even though individual Justices act con-
sistently). For definitions of consistency and coherence, see infra note 121.
121 "[Clonsistency is simply the state of non-contradiction, and two legal rules are
inconsistent if and only if they are contradictory." Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 28,
at 103. In contrast:
Coherence is a quality of conceptual unity. Coherence does not require
that a system's premises be correct, but it does demand that they form or
reflect a unitary vision of that portion of the world modeled by the system.
• . . Coherence thus brings some order and structure to what might other-
wise be a jumble of consistent propositions.
Id. at 105.
122 It might be argued that Justice Harlan's approach is somehow internally co-
herent: in the FELA cases, he stated that, absent "intervening factors," the Rule of
Four is violated if five Justices can DIG a petition that four have granted, see supra
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shall, who, by joining Justice Douglas's dissent in Triangle Improve-
ment Council, thereby accepted the view that changed circumstances
are cognizable when acknowledged by at least one of the four Justices
who voted to grant the petition, took precisely the opposite position in
joining the per curiam opinion in Uplinger.
Further, the position of Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun,
and Powell, who joined the per curiam opinion in Uplinger, cannot be
harmonized with their approach in Darden. Explaining Darden, these
Justices argued that the grant of certiorari imposes on the nongranting
Justices the obligation to take affirmative measures to protect the
Court's jurisdiction. It follows, a fortiori, that the nongranting Justices
may not take affirmative measures to deprive the Court of such juris-
diction. 23 Yet that is precisely what Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Powell did when they voted to DIG in Uplinger.
3. The Duty of an Individual Justice to Address the Merits
This last question goes not to whether the Court can dismiss cer-
tiorari, but rather to the obligations imposed on an individual Justice in
light of the Court's decision not to do so. In the FELA cases, Justice
Frankfurter took the position that even if certiorari is not dismissed, a
Justice who disagrees with that decision is under no obligation to ad-
dress the merits of the case himself.124 Justice Frankfurter stated:
The right of a Justice to dissent from an action of the Court
is historic. Of course self-restraint should guide the expres-
sion of dissent. But dissent is essential to an effective judici-
ary in a democratic society, and especially for a tribunal ex-
ercising the powers of this Court. Not four, not eight,
notes 69-73 and accompanying text; thus, in Triangle Improvement Council, he merely
applied the "intervening factors" exception to conclude that five Justices could DIG a
petition that four continued to want to decide, see supra notes 82-88 and accompanying
text. But as indicated above, Justice Harlan never explains the relevance of changed
circumstances for purposes of a DIG when four Justices continue to believe that a
decision on the merits is desirable. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. This
failure to explain why five Justices who originally voted against granting certiorari can
later invoke changed circumstances to DIG a petition is inconsistent with his defense in
the FELA cases of the general principle that four Justices can compel the majority to
dispose of a case. See Blumstein, The Supreme Court's Jurisdiction-Reform Propos-
als, Discretionary Review, and Writ Dismissals, 26 VAND. L. REV. 895, 930-31 (1973)
(discussing Justice Harlan's positions in the FELA cases and in Triangle Improvement
Council).
123 See supra notes 29-43 and accompanying text.
124 Ferguson, 352 U.S. at 526 & n.3 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
19881 1095
1096 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Justices can require another to decide a case that he regards
as not properly before the Court.125
It is important to underscore that Justice Frankfurter had no quarrel
with the Court's jurisdiction to hear the FELA cases; he in no way
suggested that the Court did not have the power to decide the merits.
His quarrel was with the Court's decision to single out for plenary
review these petitions from among all petitions properly invoking the
Court's jurisdiction. He maintained that the Court's prudential decision
to grant certiorari should not trump his prudential decision not to ad-
dress the merits of the cases. 2 '
A similar issue has arisen in recent years. In a number of cases in
which the Court has granted a petition for certiorari and summarily
reversed the lower court's decision, Justice Marshall has dissented,
without addressing the merits, on the ground that it is improper for the
Court to issue opinions in cases it does not consider sufficiently impor-
tant to accord plenary consideration. 2'7
125 Id. at 528 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
128 Two days before the decision in the FELA cases, Justice Frankfurter wrote to
Justice Harlan about a hypothetical case in which eight Justices concluded that the
Court had jurisdiction to decide a case and Justice Frankfurter concluded that it did
not. He asked: "What is my duty? Must I bow to the rule of eight and say that since
eight have ruled the case should be dealt with on the merits I must so deal with it, or
am I free to adhere to my jurisdictional view?" Letter from Justice Frankfurter to
Justice Harlan (Feb. 23, 1957) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review).
Justice Harlan replied that he did not think that "dismissal for lack of jurisdiction
is a good analogy to denial of cert." Letter from Justice Harlan to Justice Frankfurter
(Feb. 25, 1957) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). Justice
Harlan thus distinguished between cases in which one Justice believes that the Court
has no power to issue a decision on the merits, and cases in which that Justice accepts
that the Court has such power but believes that the exercise of this power would be
unwise.
12 For example, during the 1985 Term, Justice Marshall published a "form"
dissent in many such cases: "Justice Marshall dissents from this summary disposition,
which has been ordered without affording the parties prior notice or an opportunity to
file briefs on the merits." See, e.g., Acosta v. Louisiana Dep't of Health & Human
Resources, 106 S. Ct. 2876, 2878 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Dennison Mfg. Co.
v. Panduit Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1578, 1579 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting); City of Los
Angeles v. Heller, 106 S. Ct. 1571, 1573 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting); County of
Los Angeles v. Kling, 474 U.S. 936, 937 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Pennsylva-
nia v. Goldhammer, 474 U.S. 28, 31 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Lanier v. South
Carolina, 474 U.S. 25, 26-27 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Delaware v. Fensterer,
474 U.S. 15, 23 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting); California State Bd. of Equalization
v. Chemehuevi Indian Tribe, 474 U.S. 9, 12-13 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Cuyahoga Valley Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 474 U.S. 3, 8 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Until that Term, boilerplate of this sort had been confined primarily to the
death penalty area, in which Justices Brennan and Marshall state in practically every
case that they regard the death penalty as cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by
the eighth and fourteenth amendments. See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 28, at 111
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The question whether a Justice who has been unsuccessful in ad-
vocating denial or dismissal of certiorari has the right to refuse to ad-
dress a case's merits has important implications for the stability of the
Court's decisions. For example, an opinion that fails to command the
support of a majority of the Justices participating in a case-including
those who under the guise of a vote to dismiss the writ are actually
abstaining on the merits-is not labeled an "opinion of the Court" and
has no precedential value. Such an opinion does, of course, dispose of
the case before the Court, but it does not articulate a rule binding on
the lower courts or one to which the Supreme Court must accord stare
decisis effect.""8 If Justices who disagree with the Court's decision to
review a case express this disagreement by abstaining on the merits, it
becomes less likely that the prevailing opinion will enjoy majority
support.
n.39.
Justice Marshall has explained that it is unfair to reverse summarily a case on the
basis only of a certiorari petition and a response. Montana v. Hall, 107 S. Ct. 1825,
1828 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Under the Court's rules, petitions and responses
should be addressed to whether the case merits the attention of the Court. See Sup. CT.
R. 17.1, 22.1. Justice Marshall elaborated: "We do not indicate that the parties should
address the merits of the lower court's decision beyond what is necessary to demonstrate
whether the case is important enough to receive plenary review. . . . [B]ut if [parties]
fail to cover the merits of the lower court's decision in full, they risk summary disposi-
tion without having been heard." Hall, 107 S! Ct. at 1828-29 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). Other Justices have also complained about the Court's use of summary disposi-
tions. See id. at 1828 n.2 (citing cases).
Summary dispositions are not a new phenomenon and have been the subject of
powerful criticism. See Brown, The Supreme Court, 1957 Term-Foreword: Process
of Law, 72 HARV. L. REv. 77 (1958).
12' In Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982), a plurality of four Justices concluded that the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 was
unconstitutional because it "has impermissibly removed most, if not all, of 'the essential
attributes of the judicial power' from the Art. III district court, and has vested those
attributes in a non-Art. III adjunct." Id. at 87 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall,
Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., plurality). Two Justices concurred on the narrower ground
that it was improper to vest jurisdiction over state common law actions in non-article
III courts. See id. at 90-91 (Rehnquist, J., joined by O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
Chief Justice Burger emphasized that the latter theory, because it was the narrow-
est theory to which a majority of the Justices subscribed, was the holding of the Court.
Id. at 92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). He added that "notwithstanding the plurality opin-
ion, the Court does not hold today that Congress' broad grant of jurisdiction to the new
bankruptcy courts is generally inconsistent with Art. III of the Constitution." Id.; see
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("When a fragmented Court decides
a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices,
'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . '" (quoting Gregg v. Geor-
gia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ., plurality))). For
academic discussions, see Davis & Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in
the Supreme Court, 1974 DUKE L.J. 59; Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme
Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. Rxv. 756 (1980).
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For example, consider a federal criminal case in which four Jus-
tices join an opinion affirming the judgment of the lower court, four
Justices dissent on the merits, and the remaining Justice asserts that
the case does not warrant the Court's attention and therefore does not
address the merits at all.1"9 This "abstaining" Justice will provide a
fifth and decisive vote for letting stand the judgment of the court of
appeals but will also be responsible for leaving the substantive issue
unresolved, with four Justices on each side.130 The issue that induced
the Court to grant certiorari in this hypothetical case may well be an
important one, over which the courts of appeals are deeply split. At
least four (and perhaps even eight) Justices may consider it desirable
for the Court to resolve the circuit split. But the conduct of the "ab-
staining" Justice would frustrate that attempt.'' Consequently, the
12 In Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73 (1983), the Court granted certiorari to
decide whether a jury instruction in violation of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510
(1979), could constitute harmless error. Johnson, 460 U.S. at 74-75. Four Justices
joined an opinion stating that such an error could not be considered harmless, except
perhaps in rare circumstances. Id. at 87-88 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, White
& Marshall, JJ., plurality). Another group of four Justices joined an opinion disagree-
ing with this conclusion. See id. at 90 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehn-
quist & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting). The ninth Justice, Justice Stevens, did not address
the merits, voting instead to dismiss certiorari. Id. at 89 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment) (Justice Stevens did not state explicitly whether he would dismiss as improv-
idently granted or for want of jurisdiction.). He added: "Because a fifth vote is neces-
sary to authorize the entry of a Court judgment, however, I join the disposition which
will allow the judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court to stand." Id. at 89-90
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). The question that the Court had granted
certiorari to decide therefore remained unresolved. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S.
307, 325 (1985).
"I0 See Johnson, 460 U.S. at 89-90 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). This
situation is akin to one in which a case is affirmed "by an equally divided Court." Such
affirmances permit the judgment below to stand but have no precedential value. See,
e.g., Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972) ("[A]n affirmance by an equally divided
Court lis not] entitled to precedential weight."); R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN & S. SHA-
PIRO, supra note 10, § 5.4, at 264. We assume that if the Justice had addressed the
merits, he would have sided with one of the two groups.
When confronted with such a situation, Justice Frankfurter set aside his refusal to
address the merits of a FELA case:
In accordance with the view that I expressed in Rogers. . .and in which
I have since persisted, the appropriate disposition would be dismissal of
the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. If these views were en-
forced . .. [in] this case, affirmance by an equally divided Court would
result. Thereby this case would be cast into the the limbo of unexplained
adjudications, and the lower courts, as well as the profession, would be
deprived of knowing the circumstances of this litigation and the basis of
our disposition of it. Since I have registered my conviction on what I be-
lieve to be the proper disposition of the case, it is not undue compromise
with principle [to express an opinion of the merits]."
Inman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 361 U.S. 138, 141 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., mem.).
.3. This problem is also present when a majority of the Justices cannot unite
behind a single legal theory.
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conflict will remain unresolved and the Court will have squandered a
portion of its limited resources on the case. Thus, the force of the Rule
of Four is weakened when a Justice declines to address the merits of a
case that is decided by the Court.1"2
C. The Reasons for a Nonmajority Rule
The lack of statutory or regulatory direction does not make it
proper for each Justice to approach questions about the scope of the
Rule of Four anew in each case, resolving the issues in whatever way
promotes the results that he wants to reach on the merits of a particular
case. Certainly, the Court should not determine whether the Rule of
Four requires that Justices who voted to deny certiorari take measures
to protect the Court's jurisdiction simply on the basis of its views on
capital punishment, the context in which this issue arises most fre-
quently. It is not likely a mere coincidence, however, that the votes on
the scope of the Rule of Four in Darden were highly correlated both
with the votes on the merits of that case and with the Justices' general
approaches to capital punishment. 3 Similarly, Justice Frankfurter's
views on certiorari may have been influenced by a desire not to address
the merits of the FELA cases.1 34 It would be easier to believe that the
Court has dealt responsibly with the ambiguities surrounding the Rule
of Four if there were more examples, like Justice Harlan's opinion in
the FELA cases, 3 5 in which a Justice's interpretation of the Rule of
Four undermined his position on the merits.
Particularly in light of Justice Stevens's assertion that the Rule of
Four should perhaps give way to a Rule of Five as a means of reducing
the number of cases in the Court's argument docket,136 careful consid-
132 For summary reversals, however, it is unlikely that a Justice's refusal to ad-
dress the merits would have this effect. Typically the Court summarily reverses in
criminal cases in which there are at least five votes to reinstate a criminal conviction
and in which the thoughts of at least five Justices coalesce around a single opinion. See
Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380, 383 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Also, at the time that the Court decides to summarily reverse, it may well not have
expended any resources beyond those normally expended in the consideration of the
certiorari petition.
133 Darden, 473 U.S. at 927-29. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Rehn-
quist, and O'Connor voted both to deny the stay and to uphold the conviction. Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens voted both to grant the stay and to reverse
the conviction. See supra notes 21, 27-28.
134 See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
's See Ferguson, 352 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
136 Stevens, supra note 4, at 15-17. According to Justice Stevens, in the 1980 and
1981 Terms, about 30% of the cases granted certiorari were granted with only four
affirmative votes. Id. at 17. He asserts that under a Rule of Five, the number of cases
scheduled for argument would fall to a more "acceptable" level, id., implying that most
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eration is needed as to whether there is any special utility in a
nonmajority rule. Only by analyzing this issue can any conclusions be
reached regarding how conflicts between the four and the five should be
resolved.
The most common justification for the Rule of Four centers on the
exchange of views regarding cases accorded plenary review. As Justice
Brennan explained this position:
A minority of the Justices has the power to grant a petition
for certiorari over the objection of five Justices. The reason
for this "antimajoritarianism" is evident: in the context of a
preliminary five to four vote to deny, five give the four an
opportunity to change at least one mind.'
This explanation muddies the distinction between a Justice's position
on the certworthiness of a case and his position, should the case be
accorded plenary consideration, on the merits."8 If Justice Brennan
means only that four Justices will convince a fifth Justice that the case
is certworthy, then the analysis is tautological: the use of a Rule of
Four obviates the need to convince anyone to change his mind as to
whether certiorari should be granted. The only way of eliminating the
tautology (assuming, again, that Justice Brennan is referring to chang-
of the petitions in the 1980 and 1981 Terms receiving only four votes would have been
denied. Justice Stevens also argues that it was not particularly important for the Court
to decide these cases. Id. at 17-19. For an attempt to test this assertion, see Perry &
Carmichael, Have Four Vote Certiorari Cases Been Unimportant? Qualitative and
Quantitative Tests of Justice Stevens' Argument, 16 CuMB. L. REv. 419, 437-46
(1986) (noting, based on a statistical analysis of a limited sample, that "significant"
cases received five or more votes to grant certiorari).
It is far from clear, however, that a Rule of Five would significantly reduce the
number of cases in which certiorari is granted. In recent years, the Court has heard
argument during seven months, two weeks each month, and the first three days of each
week except when one of these days was a holiday. For each day, the Court has sched-
uled oral argument in four cases. Thus, there are approximately 160 argument slots.
Not surprisingly, each year the Justices have selected for argument approximately 160
cases (counting cases in both the discretionary and mandatory dockets). It may be that
the Justices view their collective role as involving the identification of the 160 cases
most worthy of review. Under such a scenario, the move from a Rule of Four to a Rule
of Five might not affect the number of granted cases.
Similarly, reducing below four the number of Justices needed to grant a case
might not greatly increase the number of cases in which certiorari is granted. Under
such a rule, each Justice might exhibit more restraint in deciding whether to vote to
grant certiorari.
"' Straight v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2004, 2006 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
138 The distinction would probably be muddied even further under a Rule of Five.
With the same voting rule applying at the case selection stage and at the merits stage, a




ing a fifth vote on certworthiness) is to embrace a view of the continued
force of the Rule of Four far more restrictive than even Justice Ste-
vens's position in Uplinger: that unless'a fifth Justice can be convinced
after briefing and argument that a case is important enough to be de-
cided, the Court should dismiss certiorari.1"9
It is far more likely that Justice Brennan is referring to the oppor-
tunity to change a fifth mind on the merits of the case. If so, then
Justice Brennan must also be embracing a view of the vote to grant
certiorari as a tentative vote on the merits to reverse the judgment be-
low. This view may well be valid in death-penalty cases, in which he
and Justice Marshall always vote to grant certiorari, but it certainly
does not govern all decisions on petitions for certiorari. Votes at the
certiorari phase have traditionally been portrayed as quite different
from votes on the merits. " " When a Justice votes to grant certiorari, he
is saying, in effect, that the Court's limited resources would be well
invested in deciding the merits of that case; he is not necessarily saying,
at the same time, that the judgment of the lower court should be re-
versed. Indeed, Justice Marshall makes just this point in his criticism
of the Court's use of summary dispositions: the incentives for litigants
at the certiorari phase are such that many litigants do not even address
the substantive merits of the issues on which review is sought.14 Simi-
larly, when a Justice votes to deny certiorari, he is reaching the oppo-
site conclusion on the wisdom of plenary consideration but is not saying
thereby that the lower court's judgment was correct. It must sometimes
be the case that Justices who have voted to grant certiorari will differ
on how they expect to vote on the merits and that Justices who have
voted to deny certiorari similarly will be divided.
To explain the shortcomings of this traditional explanation, con-
sider various categories of cases in which the Court grants certiorari.
The first category contains cases in which the rule of law is clear but a
lower court has misapplied the rule. Second, there may be cases in
which there is a conflict among the courts of appeals and the conflict
has sufficiently serious implications that the articulation of a uniform
rule by the Court is warranted. Finally, a case may involve a clear rule
of law that four Justices would like to overrule.
In the first category, Justice Brennan's hypothesis-that a vote to
grant is connected with a Justice's view on the merits-is particularly
139 See supra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
140 See Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 917-18 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J.) (discussing factors other than the merits of a case that affect the vote
for or against certiorari).
141 See supra note 127.
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likely to be true. A Justice is more likely to vote to correct a lower
court's error when he is convinced both that the lower court misapplied
the rule and that the rule is substantively correct.' 42The hard questions
with regard to cases in the first category are whether the Court should
cede a place on its crowded docket to "error correction," and, if it
should, whether it should use a nonmajority rule to decide which cases
to take. The oft-repeated phrase that the Court does not engage in er-
ror correction but instead spends its time in the loftier occupation of
articulating national norms'4 3 is, of course, little more than a cliche.
From a managerial standpoint, it is important that the Court occasion-
ally step in and correct deviant decisions below."" To give up this role
would be to abdicate an important part of its power to the lower courts,
which would find it easier to develop bodies of case law at odds with
those of the Supreme Court. But it is also important that the Court
exercise its error correction functions wisely,'4 5 and different Justices
may have different views of the propriety of granting certiorari in a
particular case, even if they are in agreement on the merits. Thus,
while the traditional explanation for the Rule of Four is perhaps accu-
rate with respect to error correction cases-the four will have a chance
to convince a fifth that the lower courts erred-it is with regard to such
cases that the justification for a nonmajority rule is least powerful. If
the Court can engage in error correction in only a small percentage of
the cases in which lower courts have erred, then it should presumably
take those cases which are most likely to be erroneous, in other words,
those cases where, at the outset, a majority of the Court is inclined to
believe the lower court should be reversed. It is precisely with regard to
these cases that a majority (or even a supermajority) grant rule would
make most sense.
142 A Justice is less likely to vote to grant when he favors the result below, even if
he recognizes that this result is inconsistent with the Court's doctrine. For example,
suppose that the lower courts rejected a public employee's procedural due process chal-
lenge to his termination because they erroneously relied on the since-rejected "bitter
with the sweet" approach of Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 154 (1974) (Rehnquist,
J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart, J., plurality). See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) ("bitter with the sweet" approach misconceives
the Constitutional guarantee). It is unlikely that Chief Justice Rehnquist, who in
Loudermill reiterated his approval of the "bitter with the sweet" approach, see id. at
563 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), would vote to grant certiorari.
" See, e.g., R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO, supra note 10, § 4.17, at
221; Harlan, Manning the Dikes: Some Comments on the Statutory Certiorari Juris-
diction and Jurisdictional Statement Practice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, 13 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 541, 551 (1958).
144 See S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 1, at 64.
145 For a comprehensive analysis of the Court's practice, see Hellman, Error Cor-
rection, Lawmaking, and the Supreme Court's Exercise of Discretionary Review, 44 U.
PITT. L. REv. 795 (1983) (discussing the 1977-1979 Terms).
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In the second category-cases involving conflicts among the lower
courts-there need not be a significant correlation between votes at the
certiorari stage and subsequent votes on the merits. With regard to con-
flicts, the question at the certiorari-granting stage is whether it is neces-
sary to have a uniform governing rule, not whether this rule should
have any particular content. That a Justice concludes that a conflict is
present, or that the persistence of the conflict is counterproductive,
should have little to do with his views as to which of the competing
approaches taken by the lower courts should be adopted. Since votes to
grant certiorari do not therefore imply that any Justices have made up
their minds on the underlying issue, there are no minds to be changed.
This does not necessarily imply that in this category a Justice's
vote to grant will be wholly divorced from his views on the merits.
Even in relatively uncontroversial cases, the Justices are not dispassion-
ate managers sitting atop the judicial hierarchy. On most issues, each
will have a certain outlook and each will be attempting to use his
votes-both at the certiorari stage and on the merits-to maximize the
impact of his views. 146 The likelihood that a Justice will vote to grant
may be directly related to his assessment of the likelihood that his pre-
ferred position will obtain a majority.1 47 The less likely that outcome,
the more likely it is that he will tolerate disuniformity.
Despite effects such as these, however, one may assume that in
this second category a Justice's expected vote on the merits plays a rela-
tively small role-though not an inconsequential one-in the decision
whether to grant certiorari. For the first two categories, then, Justice
Brennan's explanation for a nonmajority rule does not seem persuasive.
146 A Justice's choice as to which case should be the vehicle for deciding a conflict
can be significantly influenced by his tentative assessment of the merits. A Justice may
well pick among the available cases the one he believes a lower court has rendered the
most persuasive opinion in support of his position. Or, he may vote to grant in the case
presenting the fact pattern most likely to lead to adoption of his preferred rule. Or he
may vote to grant in the case in which the party he favors is represented by the best
counsel. See D. PROVINE, supra note 15, at 65.
Conversely, a Justice may engage in "defensive denials," that is, he may vote to
deny certiorari, even though he favors resolving a conflict, because the petitioner seek-
ing review presents a peculiarly unattractive fact pattern or is represented by peculiarly
incompetent counsel. The strategic considerations surrounding defensive denials are be-
yond the scope of this Article. For a discussion of the practice, see id. at 34 ("'A
decision may seem outrageously wrong to me, but if I thought the Court would affirm
it, then I'd vote to deny. I'd much prefer bad law to remain the law of the 8th Circuit
or the State of Michigan than to have it become the law of the land.'" (quoting anony-
mous Justice)).
14,7 See Ulmer, The Decision to Grant Certiorari as an Indicator to Decision "On
the Merits", 4 POLITY 429, 440-41 (1972) (empirical study based on Justice Burton's
papers showing statistical correlation between the Justices' votes on certiorari and on
the merits).
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The third category, however, presents quite different considera-
tions, which argue for a nonmajority rule, but for more complex and
subtle reasons than that the exchange of views at conference may result
in changing a Justice's mind. In this last category, a Justice votes to
grant certiorari because he views the case as a vehicle to overrule ex-
isting precedent. A Justice prepared to overrule will be far more likely
to vote to grant certiorari than one who is satisfied with the existing
precedent.-For the latter, there is little reason to grant because, even if
he prevailed on the merits, he would be no better off than if certiorari
had been denied.14 But for the former, a vote to grant is a necessary
prerequisite to the adoption of his views by the Court.
In cases in this third category, the Rule of Four does indeed, as
Justice Brennan maintains, "give the four an opportunity to change at
least one mind." '149 Thus, the Rule of Four has an educative function:
briefing and oral argument may lead Justices to reconsider their initial
positions. Absent the impetus for serious thought provided by the grant
of certiorari, the remaining Justices would continue to subscribe to the
views embodied in the Court's prior precedent.1 50
But there are less obvious ways in which the Rule of Four might
lead to the overruling of precedent. Despite the popular image, Justices
are not entirely isolated from external pressures and oblivious to what
their peers on the Court and in the outside world think about their
rulings. This is not to say, of course, that a Justice is captive to any
particular constituency, but rather that he may, in certain cases, be in-
fluenced by how he expects his ruling to be received by his colleagues
and by the public. 51 There may be cases in which a Justice, in the
absence of any outside influence, would favor reaffirming a prior prece-
dent but where such influence would l6ad him to vote to overrule if he
were compelled to take a position on the merits.
For such a Justice, the optimal course is to vote to deny certiorari.
The practical effect of this vote is to close off the reexamination of the
issue. At the same time, however, a vote to deny is far less visible than
148 There may be instances in which reaffirming existing precedent may have
some value. This Article, however, does not focus on this phenomenon.
14 Straight v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2004, 2006 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
18 See S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 1, at 124.
151 Cf F. DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY'S OPINIONS: THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
26 (1906), reprinted in E. GERHART, QUOTE IT!: MEMORABLE LEGAL QUOTATIONS
188 (1969) ("[N]o matter whether th' constitution follows th' flag or not, th' supreme
coort follows th' iliction returns."); D. PROVINE, supra note 15, at 59-62 (according to
Justice Clark, the probable impact of a decision in Naim v. Naim, an interracial mar-




a vote on the merits to reaffirm the precedent and therefore less likely
to engender negative reactions.
In contrast, if certiorari is granted, the Justice may be affected by
the potential negative response to his adherence to precedent and there-
fore vote to overrule. Thus, in a situation in which only four Justices
are comfortable with the prospect of taking a public position against the
precedent, but where additional Justices would take one if they were
forced to take a position at all, having a nonmajority rule may well
affect the outcome.
In addition, the Rule of Four has important effects, both on the
Court itself and on other actors in the legal system, even where it does
not lead immediately to the overruling of precedent. First, by allowing
a minority to bring before the Court again and again issues on which
the outcome is foreordained, it allows such a minority to expose weak-
nesses in the underpinning of the majority's position and thereby to
create a propitious climate for overruling that position in the future.
For example, it seems likely that the Court's frequent reexamination of
National League of Cities v. Usery52 ultimately led to its overruling in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.15 3 When the
rule was applied to different factual contexts it proved simply unwork-
able. 15 Similarly, the repeated granting of cases challenging the vitality
of the construction of the eleventh amendment provided by Hans v.
Louisiana155 may presage its demise.
Continued five-to-four splits on the merits on issues of great public
importance also serve as a signal to actors outside of the Court that the
stability of the precedent is precarious by underscoring that there is a
group of four Justices committed to overruling it. Moreover, such splits
indicate that the replacement of one of the five Justices in the majority
152 426 U.S. 833 (1976). In National League of Cities, the Court held that the
tenth amendment prohibited Congress from "displac[ing] the States' freedom to struc-
ture integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions." Id. at 852.
This principle was reexamined in EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236-42 (1983);
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 758-71 (1982); United Transp. Union v. Long
Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678, 683-86 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 286-93 (1981).
'5 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
15 See id. at 538-39.
155 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Four Justices have repeatedly taken the position that the
Hans doctrine-that "'an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal
courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another state,'" Pennhurst State
School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (quoting Employees v. Mis-
souri Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 280 (1973))-should be over-
ruled. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 248 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
joined by Marshall, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., dissenting); Welch v. Texas Dep't of
Highways & Pub. Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941, 2958 (1987) (Brennan, J., joined by
Marshall, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (following Atascadero).
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could well lead to an overruling. These signals can affect the way other
actors in the legal system respond to the Court's rulings.156
To lower courts, they are an invitation to make distinctions that
might otherwise not be made, in the hope of either convincing a fifth
Justice of the force of the distinction or of perhaps being reviewed at a
time at which the composition of the Court has changed. In cases in
which the precedent under attack is one striking down statutory enact-
ments on constitutional grounds, continued reexamination of this prece-
dent is a message to legislatures that, with minor tinkering, similar
statutes might be upheld.15' Frequent reexaminations of precedent also
provide litigants who wish to challenge such precedent with means to
impose higher costs on those defending it, who will be more likely to
have to litigate their cases up to the level of the Supreme Court. At the
margin, these increased costs will discourage litigation aimed at assert-
ing a right protected by a prior ruling of the Court.'58
The abortion cases are a paradigmatic use of this facet of the
power the Rule of Four accords a minority. Again and again, the Court
has rejected challenges to Roe v. Wade,"' most recently by a five-to-
four vote.'6 In the meantime, the repeated consideration of the issue
has kept it in the public eye and has prompted state legislatures to try
to probe the edges of what the Constitution permits.1 61 It also fueled
"' Under a Rule of Five, a four-Justice dissent from denial of certiorari would
not have the same effect because it would be far less visible than a four-Justice dissent
on the merits.
157 See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 106 S.
Ct. 2169, 2173-74 (1986) (discussing Pennsylvania's past attempts to restrict abortions
and successful challenges to those statutes); id. at 2178-84 (discussing the infirmities of
the statute under examination).
158 For the purposes of this discussion, it is not necessary to determine whether
these effects are good or bad. This Article is simply trying to show that different inter-
pretations of the scope of the Rule of Four have different substantive results.
The desirability of these external effects, however, is debatable. As a result of such
effects, a minority of four Justices can have an impact on the resolution of actual con-
troversies. At the same time, the legal system will exhibit incoherence, as some transac-
tions will be governed by the majority's interpretation of the law, whereas others will
be governed by the minority's interpretation. See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 227-28
(1986) (arguing that such a system lacks integrity, which requires "consistency of
principle").
159 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
180 See, e.g., Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2169 (5-4 decision); Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (6-3 decision); see also Hartigan
v. Zbaraz, 108 S. Ct. 479 (1987) (affirmance by equally divided Court).
'I For example, after the Court struck down Pennsylvania's abortion statute in
Thornburgh, see supra note 157, the Pennsylvania legislature passed a substantially
similar bill. Convinced of its unconstitutionality in light of Thornburgh, Governor
Robert Casey, an opponent of abortion, vetoed the bill. But, in his veto message, he
"provided guidelines for 'joining with the clear majority of the legislature who voted for
this bill' to forge new legislation . . ." Casey Vetoes the Abortion Bill, Phila. In-
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the strong opposition to the nomination of Judge Robert Bork,"62 who
denounced Roe v. Wade in vehement terms, 6 ' to replace Justice
Powell.""
All of the three external effects identified point in the same direc-
tion. They weaken the force that the Court's precedent will have on the
legal system by encouraging actors to take positions inconsistent with
that precedent and by potentially rewarding such actors for their efforts
either through an overruling or through a decision by other actors to let
stand an inconsistent result. Therefore, they reinforce the direct effects
that the Rule of Four has on the Court itself.
With this background in mind, it is possible to assess the effects of
different interpretations of the Rule of Four. To the extent that five
Justices can dismiss, before oral argument, a petition that four have
granted, they will be able to neutralize the Rule's effects both on the
Court itself and on other actors in the legal system. A similar result
will attach if the Court does not take measures to protect its jurisdiction
when this jurisdiction is in peril. If a case is not heard despite the
granting of certiorari, the four Justices who voted to grant will not get
the opportunity to convince a fifth, Justices who might be influenced by
outside pressures will not have to face those pressures, and the weak-
nesses in the precedent will not be exposed. With respect to outside
actors, the mere grant and later dismissal of certiorari may be a signal
of a strong cleavage within the Court, but it will be a far weaker signal
than four votes on the merits in favor of the overruling of precedent.
If the dismissal occurs after oral argument, the Rule of Four may,
in certain instances, have fulfilled its educative function. It is entirely
possible that reviewing briefs on the merits, hearing oral argument, and
deliberating in conference will prompt a Justice to reconsider his initial
position. This, of course, is the justification for the distinction made by
Justice Stevens between dismissal before oral argument and dismissal
quirer, Dec. 18, 1987, at Al, col. 5.
182 See Bork Fight Gives Abortion Rights Convention Something to Shout About,
N.Y. Times, July 13, 1987, at A12, col. 1.
"I' See, e.g, The Human Life Bill: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation
of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 315 (1982)
(statement of Judge Robert H. Bork) ("I am convinced . . . that Roe v. Wade is an
unconstitutional decision, a serious and wholly unjustifiable usurpation of state legisla-
tive authority.").
184 Because Justice Powell had voted with the five-Justice majority in Thorn-
burgh, his replacement could lead to the demise of Roe v. Wade. After the rejection of
Judge Bork by a 58-42 vote in the Senate, President Reagan nominated Judge Anthony
Kennedy, who had not expressed definitive views on the abortion question. As a result,
judge Kennedy did not face the sustained opposition of the pro-choice groups, which,
at least in part, had led to the defeat of the Bork nomination. Judge Kennedy faced
little opposition in the Senate and took Justice Powell's seat in February 1988.
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after argument."6 5 But if a Justice approaches cases without a clear
sense that he will have to vote on the merits, he will be less likely to
give to the merits of the case the same careful consideration that he
would give to them if he labored under the clear expectation that a
decision on the merits would follow. It seems likely, therefore, that an
increased possibility that dismissal will follow oral argument, even if
such dismissal does not actually occur, will dilute the Rule of Four's
role in educating the Justices.
Similarly, oral argument may increase the visibility of the Court's
dismissal, thereby sending a more powerful message throughout the le-
gal system than a dismissal preceding argument. But, in general, the
internal and external effects of the Rule of Four will be weaker if dis-
missal occurs after argument than if it does not occur at all.
Finally, if the grant of certiorari does not oblige a Justice to ad-
dress the merits, he will have a lesser incentive to give serious thought
to the merits of the case. Moreover, by not voting, he will be able to
avoid external influences that may have affected the substance of his
vote.1 6 6 In this sense, the nonmajority quality of the Rule of Four is
central to its distinctive function, both within and outside the Court, for
it serves as both a spur and a check on the tendencies of the majority.
This discussion suggests a connection between the Rule of Four
and the doctrine of stare decisis."'6 Both are nonmajority rules in that
they interfere with the desires of a current majority: the Rule of Four
because it trumps the desires of five Justices to deny certiorari, stare
decisis because it creates a presumption against reconsideration of an
established doctrine.
But these rules point in different directions. As discussed above,
the Rule of Four creates conditions that make the reconsideration of
precedent more likely. In contrast, the doctrine of stare decisis has the
opposite effect. Justice Stevens has pointed out that
the question whether a case should be overruled is not sim-
ply answered by demonstrating that the case was erroneously
decided and that the Court has the power to correct its past
mistakes. The doctrine of stare decisis requires a separate
examination. Among the questions to be considered are the
possible significance of intervening events, the possible im-
pact on settled expectations, and the risk of undermining
"' See supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
... In certain cases, a Justice may be influenced by how he expects his ruling to
be received. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
16 Cf Stevens, supra note 4, at 14 (suggesting that the Rule of Four itself may be
entitled to presumptive protection provided by the doctrine of stare decisis).
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public confidence in the stability of our basic rules of law."' 8
As a result of stare decisis, there will be cases in which five Justices
would subscribe to a particular holding if they were writing on a blank
slate but in which they will fail to do so if that holding is inconsistent
with precedent.169 The inquiry surrounding the possible overruling of
precedent has two components: whether a different rule is, in some
sense, preferable, and whether it is sufficiently more desirable to trump
stare decisis. The first condition is necessary to an overruling but is not,
by itself, sufficient.
Stare decisis also has indirect effects that serve to protect prece-
dent. By creating an additional hurdle that the Court must traverse in
order to overrule precedent, it decreases the likelihood that other actors
in the legal system will take positions inconsistent with that precedent.
In summary, to Justices who care primarily about the scope of the
majority's power, the Rule of Four and the doctrine of stare decisis
work hand-in-hand in that both constrain the ability of the majority to
dictate the outcome. In contrast, to Justices who care primarily about
the stability of precedent, they work at cross purposes because the Rule
of Four weakens precedent while stare decisis reinforces it. Thus,
whether Justices who subscribe to an expansive interpretation of the
Rule of Four would accord strong force to the doctrine of stare decisis
should depend on whether they consider the former goal more impor-
tant than the latter.
II. THE RULE TO HOLD
Individuals who practice regularly before the Supreme Court
know that the Court sometimes defers consideration of a petition for
certiorari until after it decides a case in which it has already granted
certiorari and which raises a similar issue.'" ° In 1959, Justice Clark
168 Id. at 9.
.6. See, e.g., Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982). In Patsy, the Court
upheld precedent that a plaintiff in a § 1983 action is not required to exhaust state
administrative remedies before filing his complaint. In a concurrence joined by Justice
Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor indicated that the rule of stare decisis determined her
vote: "[Clonsiderations of sound policy suggest that a § 1983 plaintiff should be re-
quired to exhaust adequate state administrative remedies before filing his complaint.
. . . However, . . . this Court has already ruled that . . . exhaustion . . . is not re-
quired in § 1983 actions. . . . Reluctantly, I concur." Id. at 516-17 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
170 See R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO, supra note 10, § 4.16, at 221
(stating that when a petition presents a question that is identical or similar to an issue
already pending before the Court in another case in which certiorari has been granted,
the Court will either grant the petition and set the case for argument or postpone
consideration of the petition until the other case has been decided and then make sum-
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mentioned that the petition in Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price17 ' had been
held "awaiting the decision" in Frank v. Maryland"' in arguing why
Eaton's claims were foreclosed by Frank. s73 Supreme Court observers
mary disposition of that case in accordance with its decision); id. § 5.9, at 274 ("On
occasion a petition for certiorari may be held, without the Court taking any action,
until some event takes place which will aid or control the determination of the
matter.").
171 360 U.S. 246 (1959).
172 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
173 360 U.S. at 249 (Clark, J., mem.). Eaton is interesting for another reason.
The case involved an appeal from an Ohio Supreme Court decision striking down a
state statute providing access for housing inspectors. Only eight Justices participated in
the decision to note probable jurisdiction. Four Justices-Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan,
and Whittaker-voted against a full hearing. In response to the public announcement
of their disagreement with the decision to note probable jurisdiction, Justice Brennan,
who had voted to note probable jurisdiction, explained that the Court employed a Rule
of Four with respect to whether cases on the appeal docket should be afforded full
briefing and oral argument similar to its Rule of Four with respect to the granting of
certiorari. Id. at 247 (Brennan, J., mem.). This practice is surprising because the dis-
missal of an appeal, unlike the denial of certiorari, is a disposition on the merits. See,
e.g., Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975) (votes to dismiss for want of a sub-
stantial federal question, "it hardly needs comment, are votes on the merits of a case."
(citation omitted)); D. PROVINE, supra note 15, at 15-16 (stating that the difference in
effect between the denial of certiorari and the dismissal of an appeal exists "because
litigants have a statutory right to a Supreme Court disposition in appeals cases").
Moreover, never before, to Justice Brennan's knowledge, had Justices who either
would have summarily affirmed the judgment below or dismissed the appeal publicly
announced their disagreement with the order setting an appellate case for argument:
The reasons for such forbearance are obvious. Votes to affirm sum-
marily, and to dismiss for want of a substantial federal question, it hardly
needs comment, are votes on the merits of a case, and public expression of
views on the merits of a case by a Justice before argument and decision
may well be misunderstood; the usual practice in judicial adjudication in
this country, where hearings are held, is that judgments follow, and not
precede them. Public respect for the judiciary might well suffer if any
basis were given for an assumption, however wrong in fact, that this were
not so.
Eaton, 360 U.S. at 247-48 (Brennan, J., mem.). Moreover, Justice Brennan argued,
the more detailed consideration and debate attendant on full consideration could alter a
Justice's views, and a Justice should not be held to his previously cast votes in confer-
ence. See id. at 248 (Brennan, J., mem.).
Like so many other disputes over the Court's operating rules, the conflict in Eaton
cannot really be understood without reference to the issues raised by the case. The four
Justices who voted against noting probable jurisdiction explained that for them Eaton's
claims were entirely foreclosed by the decision in Frank, decided just a few weeks
previously, and that the Court should therefore summarily affirm the decision of the
Ohio Supreme Court. In a statement resembling Chief Justice Burger's dissent from
the grant of certiorari in Darden v. Wainwright, 473 U.S. 927 (1985), see supra notes
44-45 and accompanying text, the four wrote that "we are of the opinion that it would
manifest disrespect by the Court for its own process to indicate its willingness to create
an opportunity to overrule a case decided only a fortnight ago. . . ." 360 U.S. at 248-
49 (Frankfurter, J., mem.). Frank had been decided by a five-to-four vote. Justice
Stewart, one of the Justices in the Frank majority, had recused himself in Eaton be-
cause his father had been on the lower court. See Eaton, ,360 U.S. at 249 (Clark, J.,
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have been able to infer decisions to "hold" from several facts: the un-
usually long time that it takes the Court to dispose of a petition raising
an issue similar to one that has recently received plenary considera-
tion;17 4 the disposition en masse of batches of petitions raising issues
just decided by the Court; and the fact that many such petitions are
granted, vacated, and remanded for reconsideration in light of a case
that has recently been decided.
175
A decision to "hold" a case, however, unlike a decision to grant
certiorari, is never published in the United States Reports or otherwise
released to the public. Furthermore, until Straight v. Wainwright,"1
6
the Court had never explicitly discussed the contours of its "hold" pol-
icy or the basis for such a policy. In Straight, the Court indicated that
the votes of four Justices were sufficient to "hold" a case but did not
reveal how many votes were necessary.17 7 Only during this past Term,
in yet another death-penalty case, did the Court reveal that "[t]hree
"1178votes suffice to hold a case ....
This Article next examines the Court's discussion of the hold rule
in Straight and assesses the extent to which the Court has developed a
consistent view of why cases are held. Two themes emerge from this
discussion: that holding petitions avoids revealing the Court's internal
processes with regard to granted cases and that holding promotes equity
among litigants-a value that might be called "judicial equal protec-
mem.).
Thus, Eaton illustrates the themes discussed in Part I of this Article, and is one of
the few cases that overtly suggests that the Rule of Four provides an opportunity for a
minority to attack precedent.
"' See, e.g., Keney v. New York, 388 U.S. 440 (1967) (petition for certiorari held
for almost two years while other obscenity cases decided).
175 Perhaps the most significant example of this phenomenon occurred in the
wake of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), which invalidated all the then-
imposed death sentences in the United States. On June 29, the same day the Court
announced Furman, it vacated the death sentences in over 100 cases. See Stewart v.
Massachusetts, 408 U.S. 845 (1972) (per curiam); 408 U.S. 933-940 (1972) (listing
cases).
Cases in which the Court grants, vacates, and remands (colloquially known as
"GVR"s) are relatively frequent. See Hellman, "Granted, Vacated, and Re-
manded"-Shedding Light on a Dark Corner of Supreme Court Practice, 67 JUIMCA-
TURE 389, 390 (1984) (Court GVRed 69 cases in the 1982 Term). Explaining its
GVR practice in Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776 (1964) (per curiam), the
Court stated that a case will be remanded for reconsideration in light of a recent deci-
sion when the Justices are "not certain that the case [is] free from all obstacles to
reversal on [the] intervening precedent." Id. at 776. The Court further stated that a
GVR does "not amount to a final determination on the merits." Id. at 777. It does,
however, "indicate that we [find the intervening case] sufficiently analogous and, per-
haps, decisive to compel re-examination of the case." Id.
176 106 S. Ct. 2004 (1986).
17 Id. at 2006-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
178 Watson v. Butler, 108 S. Ct. 6, 7 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tion." After discussing the analytic force of these two themes, this Arti-
cle returns again to its central question: how does the hold rule in gen-
eral, and its nonmajority nature in particular, serve the Court's
institutional concerns?
A. Straight v. Wainwright
Several months after the oral argument in Darden v. Wain-
wright,'7" Ronald Straight, another Florida death row inmate sched-
uled for imminent execution, filed a petition for federal habeas corpus
claiming that, at the time of his trial, Florida's capital sentencing pro-
cedure was constitutionally defective. Straight asserted that this claim
was also presented in Darden and asked the Court to stay his execution
pending the decision in that case. He also petitioned for certiorari.
By a five-to-four vote, the Court denied Straight's application for a
stay.'8 Justice Powell filed an opinion concurring in the denial of the
stay, which was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist
and O'Connor.""x Justice Brennan dissented in an opinion joined by
Justices Marshall and Blackmun."8 2 Both the concurrence and the dis-
sent addressed the question of the Court's obligation to stay an execu-
tion where the petition for certiorari presents an issue on which certio-
rari has already been granted and on which decision is pending.1
8 3
Justice Brennan's dissent indicated that "[f]our Justices have voted
to 'hold' Straight's petition because they believe that it presents an issue
sufficiently similar to Darden to warrant delaying disposition of
Straight's case until a decision is reached in that case."' 4 If the Court
had actually granted certiorari in Straight, the posture of the case
would have been identical to that of Darden and the central question
on the stay application would have been, as it was in Darden, whether
the fact that four Justices had voted for certiorari triggers a duty for the
remaining Justices to vote for a stay in order to preserve the Court's
jurisdiction. Here, however, the vote of the four Justices was not for
certiorari, but rather to postpone consideration of the petition until af-
ter the decision on the merits of Darden's claims. The question before
the Court was then whether this difference was relevant for the pur-
179 106 S. Ct 2464 (1986).
180 Straight v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2004 (1986).
181 See id. at 2004 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice White voted to deny the stay
but did not join Justice Powell's opinion.
182 See id. at 2006 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens voted to grant the
stay but did not join Justice Brennan's dissent. See id. at 2007 (Stevens, J.).
18 See Amsterdam, In Favorem Mortis: The Supreme Court and Capital Pun-
ishment, 14 HUMAN RIGHTs, Winter 1987, at 14, 56.
184 Straight, 106 S. Ct. at 2006 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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pose of determining whether the execution should be stayed.
Justice Brennan viewed Darden and Straight as similar cases in
all relevant respects. He argued that, for purposes of staying an execu-
tion, a vote to hold should be treated no differently than a vote to grant
certiorari:
A "hold" is analogous to a decision to grant a petition for
certiorari. The Court's "hold" policy represents the convic-
tion that like cases must be treated alike. Like the Rule of
Four, it grants to a minority of the Court the power to pre-
vent the majority from denying a petition for certiorari when
the minority is persuaded that the issues or questions
presented in the case to be held are similar to a case that the
Court is to decide. The principle is apparent: whether an
individual obtains relief should not turn on the fortuity of
whether his papers were the first, the second or the tenth to
reach the Court. What counts is the merits. A vote to "hold"
is a statement by a number of Justices that the disposition of
the granted case may have an effect on the merits of the case
which is to be held. The fact that a majority of the Justices
disagree with the decision to "hold" does not warrant sub-
version of the "hold" rule any more than does disagreement
by five with the decision to grant a petition for certiorari
justify departure from the Rule of Four.8 '
Apparently referring to the Court's disposition of the stay application
in Darden earlier that Term, he added: "It is unthinkable to me that
the practice that four votes to grant certiorari trigger an 'automatic'
fifth vote to stay an execution should not apply to a 'hold' when a
man's life is in the balance."' 86 For the dissenters, then, the require-
ment that held cases be treated identically to granted cases arises from
the ancient common law principle that "like cases be treated alike."'""
Generalizing from the particular context of Straight, if the Court has
granted certiorari in one case to resolve a particular issue, and, before it
has reached a decision on the merits of that case, the same issue is
presented in a second certiorari petition, the latter petition must be held
pending the adjudication of the first case to enable both petitioners to
185 Id. at 2006-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
188 Id. at 2007 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
187 One commentator states that the principle rests on the teachings of Aristotle
who "repeatedly defined justice in terms of equality" and stated in Magna Moralia I
that, "The just, then, in relation to one's neighbor is, speaking generally, the equal;
S.. since, then, the just is equal, the proportionally equal will be just." Coons, Consis-
tency, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 59 n.1 (1987).
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be treated alike. Otherwise, the treatment of the two petitioners will
depend on the "fortuity" of who filed first: the petitioner in one case
will benefit from the rule, but the petitioner in the other will not."'8
Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehn-
quist and O'Connor, strongly disagreed with the claim that because the
Court issues stays when four Justices have voted to grant certiorari, it
must also do so when three (or four) have voted to hold. This conclu-
sion rested on two arguments.
First, Justice Powell stated that a vote to grant certiorari reflects a
decision that the case raises an issue worthy of plenary consideration
and creates the possibility that the petitioner will obtain a favorable
outcome. Thus, the petitioner in a granted case has been found, in a
sense, to "merit" the Court's consideration. In contrast, according to
Justice Powell, a decision to hold may not reflect any such opinion
regarding the "merit" of the petitioner's claims: "the Court often
'holds' cases for reasons that have nothing to do with the merits of the
cases being held, as when we wish not to 'tip our hand' in advance of
an opinion's announcement."' 8 9
The Court takes a preliminary vote soon after oral argument, and
the Chief Justice, or the senior Associate Justice if the Chief Justice is
not in the majority, assigns the opinion."' Barring a switch in the
votes, the outcome of the case-although not the details of the opin-
ion-is known to the Justices well before the opinion becomes public.
Suppose, for example, that at time 1, the Court grants certiorari in
Case 1, which raises issue A. At time 2, after the Court has taken a
preliminary vote on Case 1, but before the opinion in Case 1 has been
released, it faces a petition for certiorari in Case 2, which also raises
issue A. Justice Powell maintains that, if at time 2 the Court were to
deny certiorari in Case 2, it would send the signal that issue A had
been preliminarily decided in a way that would leave unaffected the
judgment in Case 2. The Court would therefore "tip its hand" on the
188 See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 556 n.16 (1982) (noting the
"[plotential for unequal treatment" in granting plenary consideration only to one of
numerous cases presenting the same question).
Most discussions of this issue concern whether all similarly situated petitioners
will "benefit" from the Court's grant. Of course, if the result in the first case is unfa-
vorable to the first petitioner, then no "benefit" will be created. In such a case, clearly
the second petitioner will be no worse off than if his case had simply been denied. But,
in some circumstances, he will be better off: if the reason the first petitioner loses is
unrelated to the merit of the common claims in the two petitions, holding may make it
possible for the second petition ultimately to be granted.
1' Straight, 106 S. Ct. at 2005 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).
10 See R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO, supra note 10, § 1.2, at 6. See
generally Rehnquist, Sunshine in the Third Branch, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 559 (1977)
(anecdotal discussion of the Court's current practices).
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outcome of Case 1.
But this "tipping" rationale has force only to the degree that the
Court usually applies the "new" rule to all cases in which the petition
for certiorari has not yet been disposed of at the time of a grant in a
case raising the same issue. 9' If the Court operated under a contrary
rule-for example, that once it grants a petition on a particular issue it
will automatically deny certiorari on any additional petitions raising
that issue-then the denial of certiorari in subsequent cases would give
no signal as to the impending result. 92 It is only if subsequent cases
should be affected by prior grants that a decision not to hold a petition
indicates anything with regard to the outcome of the granted case.
Thus, Justice Powell's explanation of the function of holds necessarily
implies that the grant of certiorari to decide an issue triggers an obliga-
tion for the Court to treat as "alike" subsequent cases raising that same
issue.
Moreover, the tipping rationale does not provide a complete expla-
nation for the Court's hold policy. The period between when a case is
granted and the decision is reached after briefing, argument, and con-
ference will usually involve several months. During this period, the tip-
ping rationale provides no basis for holding at all, since until the Court
has reached at least a tentative outcome there is no "hand" to be
tipped. Nonetheless, it seems fairly clear that the Court often holds pe-
titions filed long before any decision has been reached in the granted
case.
1 93
191 Not all these petitions will necessarily have been filed after the granted case.
Some may have been filed at roughly the same time and thus considered at the same
conference. Others may have been filed before the granted case but, for various reasons
such as extensions of time for the respondents, nay not be decided prior to the grant.
And still others may have been held for previous cases.
For example, several of the cases GVRed in light of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972), dated back to the 1968 October Term. See supra note 175.
12 Moreover, to the extent that the Court is using a tipping rationale for holding
cases, it clearly matters whether the second petition is being considered before or after
the Court has in fact decided the first case. If the Court has not yet decided the first
case-perhaps neither full briefing nor oral argument has yet occurred-then denial of
a second petition could not "tip" the Court's hand because there is no hand yet to tip.
Petitions filed prior to oral argument in the similar case could thus be denied without
creating any suggestion of the way in which the granted case would be decided. But
such a rule could lead to costly strategic behavior on the part of litigants. For example,
petitioners might seek extensions of time within which to file their petitions, placing a
burden on the Circuit Justice to whom the application is sent. See generally R. STERN,
E. GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO, supra note 10, § 6.5, at 316-18 (discussing applications
for extension of time). Moreover, the Justices themselves might engage in wasteful stra-
tegic behavior, such as asking that petitions be "relisted" (that is, put over for reconsid-
eration) at a later conference.
"" For example, the petition in M.C.C. of Fla., Inc. v. United States, which ulti-
mately was GVRed in light of Tull v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 1831 (1987), see 107 S.
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In the particular context of Straight, Justice Powell's discussion of
the tipping rationale is unpersuasive for another reason as well. Sup-
pose that the four Justices who had voted to hold Straight had done so
solely to avoid revealing the result in Darden. The decision not to issue
a stay would nonetheless provide a tip-off as to how Darden would be
decided: if the preliminary vote in Darden had been favorable to
Straight's claims and if the Court normally applies a new rule to peti-
tioners in pending cases, then it would surely be perverse to deny
Straight a stay and let him be executed. Thus, denying a stay makes
sense only if the decision in Darden, regardless of which way the Court
decided the case, would make no difference to Straight's prospects. But
then, however, no tipping would be at stake, since nothing about the
outcome in Darden could be inferred from the denial of the stay. Thus,
the different results in Straight and Darden on the applications for stay
cannot be explained solely by reference to the hold rule's tipping
rationale.
Justice Powell's second reason for treating held cases differently
from granted cases is no more persuasive. Turning to the merits of
Straight's particular claims, Justice Powell stated: "In this case, my
vote to deny Straight's petition for certiorari-and therefore not to hold
the petition for Darden[-]reflects my view that no matter how
Darden is resolved, the judgment [in Straight] will be unaffected.M
94
This rationale fully and properly explains why Justice Powell voted
against holding the petition in Straight. That, however, was not the
issue to which his opinion was supposed to be addressed. Instead, the
question before the Court was whether the five Justices who voted
against holding nevertheless had an independent duty to protect the
Court's jurisdiction once their colleagues invoked the hold rule.
As indicated in Part I of this Article, Justice Powell had explicitly
noted in Darden that such an obligation attaches, at least in certain
circumstances, to a Justice who has voted to deny certiorari in the face
of a vote by four of his colleagues to grant. And Justice Powell did not
abandon this position in Straight, as, apparently referring to Darden,
he noted that "the Court has ordinarily stayed executions when four
members have voted to grant certiorari . . .. *", Under the rationale
Ct. 1968 (1987), was filed on January 30, 1986, see 54 U.S.L.W. 3533 (1986), nearly
a year before Tull was argued, on January 21, 1987, see 55 U.S.L.W. 3523 (1987).
The time that elapses between a grant of certiorari and oral argument can often be
eight or more months, since the Court usually fills up its oral argument calendar for
each Term by mid-January. Thus, there will be a long period during which, although
the Court has granted certiorari, it has taken absolutely no action on the granted case.




in Darden, it is irrelevant that Justice Powell believed that holding the
petition was unwarranted. What is relevant, instead, is that a sufficient
number of Justices had voted to hold. 9 '
One can hypothesize that a reason why the hold rule and the Rule
of Four might impose different obligations on the Justices who disagree
with the invocation of the rule is that the inquiry as to whether the
decision in one case might affect the judgment in another is a more
objective one than the inquiry as to whether the grant of certiorari is
appropriate. 197 Thus, it may be more understandable in the case of the
hold rule to permit Justices who disagree with the invocation of the
rule to give effect to their disagreement by refusing to protect the
Court's jurisdiction. Similarly, the goal served by the certiorari rule
(that the Court consider cases in which its intervention would benefit
the legal system) might be deemed more compelling than the goal
served by the hold rule (that certain cases be treated alike). 9
But Justice Powell did not even speculate whether either of these
reasons, or any other, justify the different obligations on the majority
imposed by the Rule of Four and the hold rule. Absent such a justifica-
tion, there is incoherence between the approach of the prevailing plu-
rality in Straight (that the Court is not obligated to preserve its juris-
diction in held cases) and the same plurality's explanation of the result
in Darden (that the Court is obligated to preserve its jurisdiction in
granted cases).'
198 Thus, Justice Powell's position in Straight resembled Chief Justice Burger's
position in Darden, see supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. That approach per-
mits Justices who have voted against further consideration of a case to assess whether
the reasons their colleagues have used for granting or holding are justified.
197 In Straight itself, for example, the Justices who voted to deny Straight's appli-
cation did so, not on the ground that Straight's claim lacked merit, but on the ground
that, because Straight had previously litigated his claim, his present petition constituted
an abuse of the writ. See Straight, 106 S. Ct. at 2005 (Powell, J., concurring).
19I If the grant of certiorari is vitiated, then the Court loses an opportunity to
issue a decision on the question presented. But if the hold is vitiated, the Court remains
able to address the question presented in the granted case.
199 Two recent capital cases confirm the Court's belief that a hold does not obli-
gate it to preserve its jurisdiction. Streetman v. Lynaugh, 108 S. Ct. 588 (1988); Watson
v. Butler, 108 S. Ct. 6 (1987). Even though these two cases had been held, the Court
denied the respective stays on four-to-four votes (one seat was vacant as a result of the
retirement of Justice Powell). Commenting on the Court's failure to grant the stay in
Streetman, Justice Brennan stated, not without a tinge of bitterness:
Had Streetman been convicted of bank robbery, this case would be of no
moment. The Court would simply hold Streetman's case until Franklin
was decided, and then take appropriate action. But death is different. Due
to the unique nature of' the death penalty, the relief that we could give any
other type of habeas corpus petitioner is unavailable to Streetman. His
case will be moot long before we can resolve Franklin-he will be dead.
• . . Death is certainly different, but I had never believed it to be different
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B. Judicial Equal Protection
Perhaps more important than the differences between the four
concurring and three dissenting Justices in Straight is the general
agreement of all seven on the obligation of the Court, following the
grant of certiorari in one case, to hold certiorari petitions raising the
same issue that are filed prior to the announcement of a decision on the
merits. As discussed in the preceding Section, this proposition is ac-
cepted implicitly in Justice Powell's discussion of the tipping rationale
and explicitly in Justice Brennan's dissent.
Through holds, petitioners in subsequent cases presenting the
same issue can benefit from the Court's ruling.2"' This concern with
what might be termed "judicial equal protection," that is, the obligation
of courts to "treat like cases alike,"' 01 is central to the notion of com-
mon law adjudication. 0 2 At first glance, however, it fits uncomfortably
with the discretionary nature of the Court's certiorari jurisdiction.
It is beyond dispute that no obligation to treat like cases alike at-
taches before the grant of certiorari on a particular issue. One day, the
Court can deny certiorari in a case in which a given issue was decided
by the lower courts in a way favorable to plaintiffs; the next day, it can
deny certiorari in another case in which the same issue was decided in
favor of defendants.20 This power is the essence of a system of discre-
tionary grants; it is precisely in this way that such a system differs from
a system of error correction. 0 4 It might be said that in this example the
Court has treated like cases alike: the two cases are "alike" in that they
both fail to present an issue that prompts the Court to exercise its dis-
cretionary jurisdiction. But they are treated alike only with respect to
the Court's interest in deciding the issue; from the perspective of the
litigants, the cases will have been treated differently.
Similarly, it is perfectly consistent with the Court's exercise of its
discretionary jurisdiction to deny certiorari in a case raising a particu-
in this way.
108 S. Ct. at 590 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
200 For a general discussion of this question, see Hellman, supra note 175.
20 See, e.g., South v. South Carolina, 474 U.S. 888, 890 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the petition for certiorari should be GVRed in light of Cald-
well v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), and adding that "[tihis Court's refusal to
treat like cases alike can only add to the unconstitutionally arbitrary nature of the death
penalty").
202 See supra note 187 (discussing the doctrine).
202 See, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 460-61 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("Reliance on denial of certiorari for any proposition impairs the vitality of
the discretion we exercise in controlling the cases we hear.").
204 See Hellman, supra note 145, at 799-800.
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lar issue and, a short time later, to grant certiorari in another case
raising the same issue and decided the same way by the lower courts.
If, for example, a conflict in the circuits developed in the interim, the
issue's claim on the Supreme Court's decisional resources will have be-
come more compelling and this difference may justify the decision to
deny certiorari in one case and to grant in the other. But even once the
Court decides that a certain issue is certworthy, it is under no obliga-
tion to take the first case that presents it. For example, the first case
may present questions as to the standing of one of the parties, the ripe-
ness of the issue for review, or possible mootness, all of which the
Court will have to face before it can reach the issue it wishes to decide,
whereas the second case may present the issue cleanly. The Court's
institutional interest, rather than the interest of the parties, is the deter-
mining factor in its decision to deny certiorari in the first case but to
grant in the second. That this decision is legitimate indicates that the
Court is under no obligation to treat the first case in the way that it
plans to treat the second. Stated differently, the Court need not treat
"alike" these two like cases.
Again, one can say that the cases are not "like" cases from the
perspective of the Court. In the first example, the case arising after the
split in the circuits presents a stronger claim on the Court's time. In the
second example, the second case permits the Court to decide the issue
with more ease. Thus, the Court's institutional interest in deploying its
resources wisely is a cognizable factor in determining the "likeness" of
cases.
But if this factor is cognizable to differentiate the case in which
certiorari was granted from an earlier case that is similar from the per-
spective of the litigants, it should also be cognizable to differentiate the
case in which certiorari is granted from a similar, later case. Thus, if,
after the Court grants certiorari, it receives a second, similar petition,
one can say that the second case is not like the first case in the funda-
mental respect that, following the grant, the Court may have no interest
in giving further consideration to the issue involved.
To say that the Court's institutional interest determines what are
"like" cases, therefore, does not help explain why a grant of certiorari
triggers the obligation to hold subsequent cases raising that issue. Thus,
defining the "likeness" of cases from the Court's perspective does not
advance the inquiry.
Returning to defining likeness of cases from the perspective of the
litigants, the hold rule can be stated as providing that the duty of the
Court to "treat like cases alike" attaches only after the grant of certio-
rari to decide a particular issue. If the Court is faced with three cases
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that are identical from the perspective of the litigants-Case 1, Case 2,
and Case 3-and if it denies certiorari in Case 1, but later grants cer-
tiorari in Case 2, then it must hold the petition in Case 3. The peti-
tioner in the third case will get the benefit of the ruling in the second,
whereas the petitioner in the first will not.
The question of why the obligation on the Supreme Court to
"treat like cases alike" arises at the time of the grant of certiorari to
decide a particular issue does not have an obvious answer. Clearly it
could not arise before, for if the Court had to engage in error correction
to ensure that all "like" cases throughout the legal system are treated
"alike," it would lose most of the flexibility provided by the discretion-
ary nature of its jurisdiction and would face an unmanageable number
of cases under any reasonable conception of the Court's decisional
capacity.
At the other end of the spectrum, it is quite clear that, following
the Supreme Court's holding on the merits of a particular issue, lower
courts must apply that rule to cases in which the underlying activity
occurs after the Supreme Court's decision. The categories that are less
clear involve cases that are pending somewhere in the judicial system at
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The horizontal axis reflects the status of the case whose merits the
Supreme Court has decided to address. This case will be referred to as
the "controlling" case, since this analysis is concerned with its potential
to control the outcome of other cases. The relevant time periods on this
axis are the grant *of certiorari, the preliminary vote of the Justices
immediately following oral argument, and the announcement of the
opinion.
The vertical axis reflects the status of another case that raises an
issue potentially affected by the outcome of the controlling case. This
latter case will be referred to as the "controlled" case. The relevant
time periods on this axis are the occurrence of the underlying activity,
the decision of the lower court, and the consideration of the petition for
certiorari by the Supreme Court.
The boxes of the matrix reflect the relationship between control-
ling and controlled cases. To place a "controlling case, controlled case"
pair in a particular box, one must first identify the latest stage that the
controlling case has traversed. Next, one must determine the earliest
stage that the controlled case has not yet traversed. Thus, for example,
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all pairs in which certiorari has been granted in the controlling case but
where a preliminary vote has not yet been taken in that case fall in the
left-hand column of Table I. Such pairs will fall in box G if the under-
lying activity in the controlled case has not yet taken place, in box D if
the underlying activity in that case has already taken place but if the
lower court has not yet decided the case, and in box A if the lower
court has decided the controlled case but the Supreme Court has not yet
considered the certiorari petition.2 '5
The question for each of the boxes is whether the rule announced
by the Supreme Court in the controlling case will apply to the con-
trolled case. Notwithstanding recent suggestions by Attorney General
Meese,2"6 any serious view of judicial equal protection dictates that ac-
tivities that occur after the Supreme Court has announced a rule of law
be governed by that rule, unless and until the Supreme Court itself
decides otherwise. The outcome of cases in Box J is therefore straight-
forward: the new rule, whatever its contours, will apply to the con-
trolled case. So, for example, any evidence seized in violation of the
fourth amendment by state officers after the Supreme Court held the
exclusionary rule applicable to the states20 7 was necessarily suppressed.
In short, Box J represents the vast bulk of all cases; indeed, in such
cases, it is a misnomer to refer to the Supreme Court's decision as a
"new" rule, since it represents the existing law at the time the underly-
ing activity takes place.
Judicial equal protection and the hierarchical structure of the judi-
ciary similarly require that lower courts apply to cases coming before
them the rule announced by the Court in the controlling case. In other
words, cases in Box F are governed by the new rule. But the rules
announced by the Court always have two distinct components-one
substantive, the other temporal. The substantive component concerns
the specific legal principle decided in the controlling case, for example,
that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment cannot be
introduced in the prosecution's case in chief. 08 The temporal compo-
nent concerns the universe of cases to which the substantive component
200 This model assumes that each case is adjudicated by only one lower court. But
this analysis does not depend on such assumption. More lower courts would simply add
more rows to Table I.
20 See Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REv. 979, 983 (1987)
("[A] constitutional decision by the Supreme Court ... binds the parties in a case and
also the executive branch for whatever enforcement is necessary. But such a decision
does not establish a supreme law of the land that is binding on all persons and govern-
ment henceforth and forevermore.").




will apply, for example, that cases on direct appeal at the time the new
rule was announced shall be governed by the new rule,20 9 or that the
new rule- shall not apply to collateral review of final state court convic-
tions."O In other words, the temporal component of a decision is what
determines the extent to which the substantive rule is to be given retro-
active application."'
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss in depth
the Court's jurisprudence of retroactivity,212 that debate sheds signifi-
cant light on the issues underlying the Court's use of holds. In particu-
lar, the debate over retroactivity has focused on the scope of the Court's
duty to treat all litigants equally by giving them all, or at least a sub-
stantial class of them, the benefit of a new rule regardless of whether
their case is the vehicle for announcing that rule, the very issue before
the Court in Straight. For this reason, a brief summary of that body of
law is necessary before considering the remaining boxes in Table I; this
inquiry is confined to the domain of criminal law, in which the issue
has received the most attention.
The nature of the Court's recent concern with retroactivity can be
traced to a 1965 case, Linkletter v. Walker,2" which determined the
applicability of Mapp v. Ohio's2M extension of the exclusionary rule to
state-court proceedings. Linkletter held that the exclusionary rule an-
nounced in Mapp would not apply to cases in which the defendant's
209 See, e.g., Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86 (1963) (case was on direct
appeal when Mapp was decided); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 25 (1963) (same); see
also Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 (stating that the Court's decisions "ap-
plied to cases still pending on direct review at the time [they are] rendered").
210 See Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 619-20.
211 Cases in boxes G and H raise a "hold" question for lower courts: if a lower
court knows that an issue is currently pending before the Supreme Court (and, obvi-
ously, the lower court will be unable to determine whether the case falls in box G or
box H since the lower court will not know the Supreme Court's preliminary vote), it
can either decide the case on the basis of existing law or it can defer consideration until
after the Supreme Court's decision and then apply the new substantive and temporal
rules.
212 The vast majority of the cases in which the Court has considered issues of
retroactivity have involved issues of constitutional criminal procedure, such as the scope
of the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments. See Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactiv-
ity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61 VA. L. REv. 1557, 1558-96 (1975) (discussing
Linkletter and its progeny of criminal procedure cases from 1965-1975). Although this
discussion is confined to these cases, the Court has discussed retroactivity in the civil
context. See, e.g., Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
719-22 (1978) (retroactive liability under Title VII); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404
U.S. 97, 105-109 (1971) (retroactive application of a state statute of limitations). Noth-
ing in the Court's analysis in those cases undercuts the point that the Court's treatment
of retroactivity is intimately connected to its approach to various of its operating rules.
213 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
214 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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conviction had become final prior to the decision in Mapp.215 From
Linkletter until last Term,216 the Court employed a rule-specific, three-
part test, which considered the purpose of the new rule, the extent to
which law enforcement authorities had relied on the old rule, and the
effect retroactivity would have on the administration of justice.21 The
end result of this test was that the Court's decisions regarding retroac-
tivity ran the gamut: some rules were applied even to cases in which
the claim was first raised in a petition for habeas corpus;2"' some rules
were applied only to cases then pending on direct appeal; 1 9 and others
were applied only to the actual litigants before the Court and to liti-
gants in cases where the underlying activity (for example, the search or
the lineup) occurred after the announcement of the decision.220 In some
cases, then, one defendant would receive the benefit of a new rule while
another defendant, subject to an identical violation of his constitutional
rights, would remain in prison.22'
Justice Harlan, normally a strong partisan of judicial restraint,
argued that, with respect to cases pending on direct appeal, it was in-
tolerable for the Court to refuse to grant relief to all defendants: "Sim-
ply fishing one case from the stream of appellate review, using it as a
vehicle for pronouncing new constitutional standards, and then permit-
ting a stream of similar cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by
that new rule constitute an indefensible departure from this model of
215 By "final," the Court meant "where the judgment of conviction was rendered,
the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari had elapsed
before [the] decision in Mapp v. Ohio." Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 622 n.5.
216 See infra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
217 See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967) (discussing the three
criteria); Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636 (applying the three criteria).
218 See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 & n.6 (1971) (giving
retroactive effect to Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)).
218 See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
220 See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 254 (1969) (holding that Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), would be applied only to cases in which the
prosecution sought to introduce the fruits of electronic surveillance conducted after De-
cember 18, 1967, the date that Katz was decided); DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631,
633-35 (1968) (holding that the rule of Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968),
requiring the states to respect the right to a jury trial was to apply only to trials begun
after the Duncan decision); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 296 (1967) (holding that
the rule announced in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), and Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), would "affect only those cases and all future cases
which involve confrontations for identification purposes conducted in the absence of
counsel after [the Court's opinions in Wade and Gilbert]").
221 See, e.g., Stovall, 388 U.S. at 303-04 (Black, J., dissenting) (pointing out that
defendants already convicted and in prison because of unconstitutionally obtained evi-




judicial review. '222 This past Term, in Griffith v. Kentucky,223 the
Court adopted Justice Harlan's approach to the retroactivity of crimi-
nal cases on direct appeal, abandoning the prior three-part test and
holding that "failure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to
criminal cases pending on direct review violates basic norms of constitu-
tional adjudication. '22 4 In other words, all cases will now be controlled
by the new rule, assuming, of course, that the case is a "direct" rather
than a collateral case.
The Court's decision in Griffith focused principally on the connec-
tion between the perceived vagaries of a system of discretionary grants
and the obligation to "treat like cases alike":
[S]elective application of new rules violates the principle of
treating similarly situated defendants the same. . . . [T]he
problem with not applying new rules to cases pending on
direct review is "the actual inequity that results when the
Court chooses which of many similarly situated defendants
should be the chance beneficiary" of a new rule.225
Griffith did not cure this problem, however, as it created an "inequity"
between criminal cases still on direct review and criminal cases on
habeas review. 22' This "inequity" may be particularly pernicious, since
the availability of habeas relief appears to induce the Court to deny
certiorari in cases that, otherwise, might merit a grant.227 But, of
222 Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
223 107 S. Ct. 708 (1987). Griffith considered whether the Court's decision the
previous Term in Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), which held that the
equal protection clause barred prosecutors from using peremptory challenges to strike
jurors on the basis of race, should be applied retroactively. In Allen v. Hardy, 106 S.
Ct. 2878 (1986) (per curiam), the Court had refused to apply the Batson rule, which
overruled a portion of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), to cases pending on
habeas.
224 107 S. Ct. at 713. Since the retroactivity of Batson to cases on habeas had
already been decided, see supra note 223, Griffith did not address the determination of
retroactivity in habeas cases.
22' Griffith, 107 S. Ct. at 713-14 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S.
537, 555 n.16 (1982)); see also id. at 716 ("It was solely the fortuities of the judicial
process that determined the case this Court chose initially to hear on plenary review.");
Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 US. 233, 247 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring)
("[Tihe lucky individual ... enjoys retroactive application. . .. This hardly comports
with the ideal of 'administration of justice with an even hand.'" (quoting Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 255 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting))).
228 Cf Griffith, 107 S. Ct. at 716-17 (Powell, J., concurring) (reiterating his
hope, first stated in Hankerson, see supra note 225, that the Court will apply Justice
Harlan's view that "habeas petitions generally should be judged according to the consti-
tutional standards existing at the time of conviction").
2" This practice is most visible in death penalty cases, in which the inequity is, of
course, most troubling. For example, in Shippy v. Estelle, 440 U.S. 968 (1979), the
Court denied certiorari based solely on the representations of the State that "'as long as
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course, as soon as a criminal defendant's certiorari petition on direct
review is denied, the defendant loses the benefits of Griffith's retroactiv-
ity rule.228 Moreover, should the Court actually decide to grant certio-
rari in a habeas case, there would be an "inequity" between the peti-
tioner in that case, who would presumably get the benefit of the
Court's holding in her case, and other similarly situated habeas peti-
tioners, who would not. But even though it does not establish total hori-
[petitioner] is actively pursuing his right to a writ of habeas corpus, [he] will not be
executed.'" Id. at 968 (quoting brief of State of Texas, filed in opposition to certiorari
petition); cf. Jurek v. Estelle, 430 U.S. 951, 951 (1977) ("Without intimating any
views on the merits of the questions presented to the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Texas in petitioner's pending application for a writ of habeas
corpus, the petition for writ of certiorari [to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas] is
denied.").
In Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), the Court, reviewing the -denial of
federal habeas relief, addressed the defendant's argument that the use of psychiatrists at
his sentencing hearing to predict future dangerousness was unconstitutional. Id. at 896-
97. The defendant had raised this argument previously in his direct appeal, but the
Court had denied certiorari on that occasion. Id. at 884-85.
Similarly, last Term, in Stewart v. Wainwright, 55 U.S.L.W. 3228 (Oct. 3, 1986),
the Court denied a stay of execution pending the filing of a certiorari petition. Justice
Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, dissented, noting that
"[airguably, the Court's decision is justified by the fact[] that ...the 'fundamental
miscarriage of justice' inquiry can better be performed . . . in a federal habeas corpus
proceeding . . . ." Id. at 3229 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
It is true that in some cases, the habeas corpus proceedings may produce a record
that will aid the Supreme Court's consideration of the legal issues presented. See
Pilcher v. Mississippi, 420 U.S. 938, 938 (1975) ("Certiorari denied without prejudice
to an application for writ of habeas corpus in the appropriate United States District
Court for consideration of questions not adequately presented by the record before
us."). But even in those cases, the Court's practice is troubling because of the difference
in the applicable retroactivity rules.
228 The defendant would then be unable to benefit from the new substantive rule
either in the lower courts or in the Supreme Court. Thus, for example, the defendant
in McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961 (1983), petitioned for review of a New York
Court of Appeals decision upholding his criminal conviction in the face of a claim that
the prosecutor had used his peremptory challenges to remove all blacks from the jury.
In essence, McCray sought to have the Court overrule Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202
(1965).
The Court denied certiorari, apparently with only two Justices voting to grant,
but three other Justices joined an opinion that invited McCray to litigate his claims in
a federal habeas proceeding. See McCray, 461 U.S. at 963 (Marshall, J., joined by
Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 961 (Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun & Powell, JJ.).
Ultimately, McCray won his federal habeas petition in the Second Circuit, Mc-
Cray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984), and the state petitioned for certiorari
(albeit on a somewhat different issue than the question whether such use of challenges
was permitted). In the meantime, the Supreme Court granted another petition seeking
to limit the scope of Swain. See Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986). In its
decision, the Court overruled Swain. Id. at 1719-24. Subsequently, the Court granted
the state's petition in McCray's case, vacated the judgment of the Second Circuit, and
remanded the case for reconsideration "in light of" Allen v. Hardy, 106 S. Ct. 2878
(1986), which had held that habeas petitioners are not entitled to the benefit of Batson.
See Abrams v. McCray, 106 S. Ct. 3289 (1986).
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zontal fairness-which could only be achieved in a system in which
unlimited reexaminations of criminal convictions was permitted-the
rule in Griffith eliminates the inequities among cases on direct appeal.
Returning to Table I, unlike Boxes D through J, which involve
situations in which a lower court must decide how to act in the face of
the Supreme Court's actions, Boxes A through C represent decisions
that must be made by the Supreme Court itself. Box C represents those
cases in which, at the time the certiorari petition is filed, the Supreme
Court has a publicly announced, controlling rule, but in which that
rule was not in place when those cases were adjudicated by the court
immediately below the Supreme Court. The Court's response to cases
in Box C depends on the age of the controlling rule and the posture of
the controlled case. In a post-Griffith world in which rules are retroac-
tively applied to cases pending on direct appeal but are not necessarily
applied to cases on habeas review, if the rule in the controlling case was
announced after the petitioner's conviction became final and the peti-
tioner is appealing from an adverse decision by a federal or state habeas
court, the Court may simply deny the petition. In contrast, if the peti-
tioner is claiming the benefit on direct appeal of the new rule an-
nounced after the lower court's affirmance of her conviction, the Court
will grant the petition, summarily vacate the decision of the lower
court, and remand the case for further proceedings "in light of" the
decision in the controlling case, a procedure colloquially known as
"GVR."22 The practice of GVR does not aid the Court in its core
function of articulating norms of national applicability, as the norm
itself will already have been articulated in the controlling case. Thus,
absent any concern that the Court treat "like cases alike," petitions in
Box C would simply be denied.
Finally, Boxes A and B represent the two situations in which the
Court must make a decision about whether to hold a case. By holding a
petition, the Court makes the petitioner eligible for whatever benefit
she might derive from the rule that will be announced in the controlling
case. Once the controlling case is decided, and if its rationale could af-
fect the judgment of the lower court in the controlled case, the Court
would GVR the controlled case; otherwise the Court would deny the
petition.
The difference between the two boxes is that in Box B the Court,
although not the litigants, knows the preliminary vote in the controlling
case. If the sole objective of the hold rule were to avoid tipping, then
the Court would not hold cases in Box A (that is, postgrant, pre-deci-
22"9 See supra note 175.
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sion-conference cases).230 It is only a concern with judicial equal pro-
tection that can explain why cases in Box A are held. But if judicial
equal protection were the sole justification for holds, then, while every
case in Box A would be held (since it would be as-yet unclear whether
petitioners would benefit from a new rule), only some of the cases in
Box B would be held, since the Court would be able to determine those
cases in which a new rule might alter the outcome of the controlled
case. Thus, only the tipping rationale explains why all cases in Box B
are held.
The proposition that new rules articulated in criminal cases
should be given retroactive application to cases pending on direct re-
view does not compel a hold in Boxes A and B in the same way that it
compels a GVR in Box C. When the Court considers a petition in a
controlled case before it has announced the opinion in the controlling
case, it could, consistent with its retroactivity rules, simply deny the
petition. After all, at the time the controlled case petition is being ad-
dressed, the old rule is still in effect. If the Court took this approach,
then when the controlling case is decided, the controlled case would no
longer be pending on direct review and therefore would not be covered
by the retroactivity rule. Thus, holding cases so that they are still on
direct review at the time that the controlling case is decided gives a
somewhat larger scope to the retroactive application of new rules.
It appears, however, that the hold rule is grounded as much on
practical considerations as on a broader vision of judicial equal protec-
tion. If the Court were to GVR only those petitions that it considered
for the first time after it had announced the rule in the controlling case,
it would create a strong incentive for litigants to delay filing their cer-
tiorari petitions whenever the Court had granted a case raising a simi-
lar issue.2 ' Similarly, individual Justices could delay the consideration
of petitions in controlled cases if they wanted to make such petitions the
beneficiaries of rules about to be announced in controlling cases. A
broad hold rule, however, eliminates both problems. Thus, holding
cases serves the interests both of the litigants, who can benefit from new
rules even when their petitions are not the ones ultimately selected for
review, and of the Court, which benefits from the elimination of poten-
tially inefficient strategic behavior.
... See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
'3 They can do so, for example, by filing petitions for rehearing in the lower
courts or applications for extensions of time on their certiorari petition in the Supreme
Court. See supra note 192.
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C. The Institutional Interest in Holds
The preceding discussion has not focused on the nonmajority na-
ture of the hold rule. That aspect of the rule cannot be traced to the
Court's desire to "treat like cases alike." First, the decision to GVR,
which directly determines which cases will in fact receive the benefit of
the new rule, is a majority rule. If the Court were seriously concerned
that every case that might conceivably be affected by the rule in the
controlling case be reexamined by the lower courts, it would adopt a
nonmajority rule at the GVR stage. Moreover, if, following a GVR,
the lower court erroneously fails to apply the rule in the controlling
case, the Supreme Court is unlikely to grant a subsequent petition for
certiorari, as at that point the only reason for doing so would be to
correct an error. It is odd, then, that only one of the elements of the
Supreme Court's judicial equal protection policy should show a height-
ened concern for "treating like cases alike."
A more appropriate justification for the hold rule as a Rule of
Three is that the Justices themselves benefit from holding cases pend-
ing a decision in the case on which they have granted certiorari. Be-
cause a nonmajority hold rule will result in more GVRs than a major-
ity hold rule, it will give litigants a greater incentive to file certiorari
petitions. Thus, when the Justices wish to consider an issue on the
merits, they will have before them a wider array of cases from which to
choose.2 32
Moreover, even though typically the Court will grant certiorari on
only one case, it will benefit from having before it other cases present-
ing the issue in different factual contexts. Given its limited decisional
capacity, the Court often feels a conflict between its role as an adjudica-
tor of the claims of the parties before it and its role as an overseer of a
vast judicial and legal system. The former role counsels for narrow
holdings. The latter role, in contrast, is best promoted by more liberal
use of dicta, since through such dicta the Court will be able to direct
the outcomes of a greater number of cases. To the extent that the Court
employs dicta as a managerial tool, the quality of its decisions will be
enhanced by having before it sets of concrete facts against which to test
such dicta. Viewed in this way, the hold rule plays a role not only in
the decision of the controlled case, but also in that of the controlling
22 Along similar lines, Professors Estreicher and Sexton have argued that the
Justices make better case selection decisions at conferences in which they discuss a
relatively large number of cases. S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 1, at 109,
122.
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case; it serves as a tool that enables the Court to reach better substan-
tive decisions.2 8
The nonmajority character of the hold rule may also conserve the
Court's resources by decreasing the resources that individual Justices
invest in persuading their colleagues to hold. If a hold required more
votes, the Justices who favored holding a case might spend time and
energy seeking to persuade other Justices. Their efforts would often be
wasted, since after a granted case is decided it is likely that a consensus
will emerge as to whether it controls a held case. On the other side of
the equation, there is little institutional cost to postponing consideration
of certiorari petitions.
This equation may explain why it takes more votes to grant certio-
rari than to hold a petition. In the case of a grant, unlike the case of a
hold, there are significant institutional costs, as it is certainly burden-
some for the Court to evaluate briefs on the merits, hear oral argument,
and render a decision.234
In summary, this Article has discussed three rationales for the
hold rule. The first two, the "tipping" rationale and the "judicial equal
protection" rationale, on which the opinions in Straight focused, each
explain only a portion of the cases to which the Court applies this rule,
233 That many cases are pending will also lead to the filing of more amicus briefs.
While many of these briefs do not provide much more than a crude barometer of senti-
ment about the questions before the Court, others can either supplement inadequate
presentations by the parties or supply the Court with useful information.
The hold rule encourages filings in two respects. First, those parties whose cases
are pending will be encouraged to file briefs, since they will be affected directly by the
Court's rulings. Second, because the Court's hold/retroactivity jurisprudence makes the
potential scope of each substantive rule broader, there will be an incentive for groups,
such as professional and trade associations, to file amicus briefs.
134 This difference in costs points to another factor: deference to a small minority
in hold decisions may contribute significantly to the Court's collegiality. One of the
central features of nonmajority rules is that they lessen the likelihood of a tyranny of
the majority in which the minority lacks any power over decisions. See D. MUELLER,
PUBLIC CHOICE 19-67 (1979). Thus, one should expect nonmajority rules to be partic-
ularly prevalent in bodies with relatively stable memberships that make a significant
number of decisions, many of them preliminary in nature. The cloture rules of the
Senate (which permit a minority to control the agenda by requiring a supermajority to
cut off debate) are another illustration of the phenomenon discussed in this Article. See
Rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, reprinted in STANDING RULES OF
THE SENATE AND CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET AND IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL ACT OF
1974, AS AMENDED, S. Doc. No. 22, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-17 (1986) (requiring an
affirmative vote of 3/5 of senators to close debate on a matter pending before the
Senate).
Since the majority retains ultimate power to issue dispositions on the merits, pro-
viding a group of three Justices with the power to hold may be a fairly costless gesture
in the direction of recognizing the feelings of a minority. Of course, annoyance by the
majority with strategic behavior by the minority, which seems to pervade the considera-




although taken together they explain all such cases. These two ratio-
nales, however, do not justify the nonmajority nature of the hold rule.
For this, one must look to a third rationale-the rule's benefits to the
Court's decisional processes.
CONCLUSION
After observing several days of oral argument at the Supreme
Court, a visitor from Mars would probably conclude that the Court's
operating rules have been well established for decades and that all of
the present Justices feel great pride at deciding cases under procedures
set up by their predecessors. After all, the Martian will have noticed,
day after day, that the Court's proceedings start at precisely the same
time, that the Justices enter the courtroom in precisely the same order,
that they sit in precisely the same seats, that when lawyers are admitted
to the Supreme Court bar they are greeted by the Chief Justice with
precisely the same words, that male lawyers for the Government wear
precisely the same clothes, and so forth.
The image the Court conveys to casual observers is that of an in-
stitution deeply respectful of its own traditions. What is far less appar-
ent to such observers, or for that matter to the vast majority of lawyers
in this country, is that the emphasis on consistent procedures is little
more than a veneer. This Article has attempted to show that beneath
this largely irrelevant veneer is a great deal of chaos. The Court's
cleavages and shifting positions with respect to the rules that govern the
exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction are analogous to daily fights
over the times when oral argument would begin or where the Justices
would sit, except of course that they are far more important because
they can have an impact on serious substantive issues.2"5
... The Court is also deeply divided about other procedural questions. The case of
summary dispositions has already been discussed. See supra note 127.
Similarly, the Court is split on whether it should deny motions to proceed in
forma pauperis without first inquiring "whether the questions presented in the petition
for certiorari or jurisdictional statement merit. . . plenary review." See Brown v. Her-
ald Co., 464 U.S. 928, 928 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Brown v. Herald Co.,
the Court denied such motions by a five-to-four vote. Justice Brennan, joined by Jus-
tices Marshall and Blackmun, dissented, noting that each year the Court receives ap-
proximately 1000 motions supported by affidavit for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
and that the Court's practice in the past had been "not to pass" on the motion "but to
proceed directly to grant or deny the petition based on the merits of the questions
presented in the petition or statement." Id. at 929 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He con-
cluded: "Our time certainly can be spent in more productive effort than the determina-
tion of whether a petitioner or appellant is able to pay $200 plus the cost of printing
[the cost of proceeding if in forma pauperis status is denied] and still provide himself
and his dependents the necessities of life." Id. at 931 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In a
separate dissent, Justice Stevens stated: "I see no purpose . . . in insisting that these
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The Court's treatment of the two procedural rules on which this
Article has focused-the Rule of Four and the hold rule-is indicative
of the low premium the Justices place, more generally, both on consis-
tency and coherence. As to particular elements of these rules, the Jus-
tices have shifted their interpretations to favor the substantive result
that they wished to achieve in particular cases, and they have made no
effort to harmonize such elements with the remainder of the legal
landscape.
Consistency and coherence should play as important a role with
respect to the two procedural rules discussed in this Article as they do
with respect to substantive doctrines."3 6 Indeed, as Justice Van Devan-
ter told Congress in his testimony on the Judiciary Act of 1925: "When
I speak of a discretionary jurisdiction on certiorari I do not mean, of
course, that the Supreme Court merely exercises a choice or will in
granting or refusing the writ, but that it exercises a sound judicial dis-




What is at stake, in short, is respect for legal principle. One must
therefore conclude that the Court's treatment of the Rule of Four and
the hold rule is symptomatic of a broad and troubling disregard for the
traditional common law models of judging."8
petitioners-none of whom is represented by counsel who could advise them that their
petitions stand no chance of being granted-pay a fee for the privilege of having their
petitions denied." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
This issue has also become one in which "form" dissents, containing identical boil-
erplate rationales, are now filed. See supra note 127. For example, in the period from
October to December 1987, the Court denied in forma pauperis status on a four-to-four
vote (one seat was vacant as a result of Justice Powell's retirement) in at least seven
cases. In each of these cases, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens filed
a joint dissent stating: "For the reasons expressed in Brown v. Herald Co. Inc., we
deny the petition . . . without reaching the merits of the motion to proceed in forma
pauperis." Shibuya v. Voss, 108 S. Ct. 483, 483 (1987); Bennett v. North Am. Van
Lines, 108 S. Ct. 343, 343 (1987); Jones v. Farm Credit Admin., 108 S. Ct. 282, 282-
83 (1987); McCullum v. Michigan, 108 S. Ct. 62, 62 (1987); Brown v. City of St.
Louis, 108 S. Ct. 61, 61-62 (1987); Maclin v. Mobile Consortium, 108 S. Ct. 60, 60-61
(1987); In re Concoby, 108 S. Ct. 60, 60 (1987).
These divisions illustrate the low premium that the Court places on deciding insti-
tutional issues and its reticence in invoking its rulemaking authority to establish clear
procedural rules.
236
It is commonplace among lawyers that the manner in which a judicial
tribunal conducts its business is an important part of its business. It is not
only that procedure gives its shape to substance, though that of course is
true. The very effectiveness of the tribunal, the respect and authority ac-
corded its decisions, may be increased or diminished as its procedures are
or are not thought fair.
Brown, supra note 127, at 77 (discussing summary dispositions in the Supreme Court).
"' Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 32 (emphasis added).
238 It is true, of course, that the common law did not deal with the exercise of
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Unfortunately, the Court is unlikely to address these issues in a
satisfactory manner in the context of case-by-case adjudication. Its two
most recent forays-Darden v. Wainwright39 and Straight v. Wain-
wright24 -both involved applications for stays of executions. Because
the Court's nonmajority and majority rules often come into conflict in
the context of stays, it is likely that the scope of the Court's
nonmajority rules will receive further consideration in death penalty
cases.
Such cases are particularly ill-suited for reasoned decisionmaking
regarding the procedural questions discussed in this Article. First, they
involve a substantive issue on which the Court is deeply divided and on
which the Justices exhibit strong emotions. Second, petitions for stays
of executions must often be adjudicated the same day they are filed,
making it difficult for the Court to reflect about how its vision of its
role in the judicial system should affect the manner in which it handles
its discretionary jurisdiction. Rather, questions as to the proper scope of
the Rule of Four and the hold rule can best be resolved through the
Court's rulemaking procedures, in which they can be considered di-
vorced from the divisive influence of an unrelated issue-the constitu-
tionality of the death penalty-and with sufficient time for productive
reflection.241 Perhaps this Article will provide, at least in small mea-
sure, an incentive for the Justices to systematically address these
questions.
discretionary jurisdiction. But, as Justice Van Devanter noted, the common law method
is applicable to the Supreme Court's decisions on how to manage its discretionary
docket.
239 473 U.S. 927 (1985).
240 106 S. Ct. 2004 (1986).
241 Congress could address these questions by amending the statute establishing
the Supreme Court's discretionary jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257-59 (1982
& Supp. III 1985). But because it is unlikely that Congress will be as familiar with the
relevant issues as the Justices, it is preferable for the Court itself to articulate the
principles defining the scope of the Rule of Four and of the hold rule.
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